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The Institutional Dynamics of Sectarianism: Education and 
Personal Status Laws in Postwar Lebanon 
 
 
Jinan Al-Habbal 
 
 
Abstract 
  
 
This thesis investigates how Lebanese institutions construct a sectarian culture that deepens 
sectarian identities and strengthens citizens’ allegiance to sectarian leaders. To this end, the 
thesis examines how the sectarian educational system and personal status laws manufacture 
and perpetuate this sectarian culture. It delineates how sectarian elites manipulate these 
institutions to serve their own interests and entrench a clientelist system. Hence, this study 
demonstrates how the resilience of non-democratic norms in Lebanon has less to do with 
political culture or a resilient Lebanese sectarian mind. Rather it is sectarian institutions that 
impede the creation of a democratic society and hinder reforms. By examining the dynamics 
of sectarian institutions, this study shows how Lebanese citizens are divided into sectarian 
groups embracing sectarian identities rather than a trans-sectarian national Lebanese identity. 
This thesis examines how sectarian elites control the educational system and personal status 
laws to embed sectarian identities. Rather than reforming the educational system, sectarian 
elites hindered the formation of a new unified history book, published civic education books 
that do not create a sense of citizenship, and reinstated religious education. Moreover, each 
sectarian elite has established his own Lebanese University branch which weakened the 
national identity of the university and hardened sectarian allegiances. The thesis also 
examines how personal status laws in Lebanon oblige the Lebanese citizens to belong to a 
specific sect and abide by its regulations. Civil marriage is forbidden in Lebanon which 
forces the Lebanese people wishing to receive a civil marriage to travel and follow foreign 
laws. Sectarian elites have blocked numerous attempts to adopt an optional civil personal 
status law. This has limited intersectarian marriages and increased the sense of belonging to a 
sect. Finally, this study proposes secularism as an alternative to the Lebanese political system 
and suggests several workable recommendations to change the sectarian system. 
 
 
Keywords: Sectarianism, Educational System, Personal Status Laws, Sectarian Elites,  
        Secularism. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“As they struggle to gain or preserve independence, a certain kind of fidelity to God, a 
certain confessional belonging becomes constitutive of their political identity.” 
Charles Taylor 
 
1.1 – Situating the Thesis 
Lebanon has eighteen recognized sects that have shaped its politics and multi-
sectarian culture (Zayd El-Zein 2010a). The confessional system redirects individual 
allegiances to sectarian groups rather than the country, thus increasing sectarian 
tensions. Lebanese institutions are permeated by neopatrimonial networks that repress 
citizens’ demands and allow leaders to control them (Anderson 1987). Nazih Ayubi 
argues that states re-create associations and institutions in a form that suits them so that 
no one else will be able to occupy the political and institutional vacuum they have 
established (1996). Joel Migdal emphasizes that weak states have strong societal actors 
that regulate social relationships and utilize resources for their own interests (1988). 
Lebanon is dotted with sectarian identities and ‘stigmatized groups’ engendering 
a weak state with weak institutions (Hudson 1977; Anderson 1987). There is no 
separation between Lebanese political elites and the formation of institutions and 
society. Politicians appoint officials based on their sect and class rather than merit. They 
also control state institutions to preserve their own interests and extend their power, 
which in turn weakens existing institutions (Anderson 1987). Lebanese political leaders 
have the ability to abuse institutions and guarantee their own political and sectarian 
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interests in this confessional system, “a system in which persons make institutions, and 
not the other way around” (Rosen 2006, 170).  
Neopatrimonial networks in Lebanon create contested state-society relations. 
These networks create clientelism, prohibit citizens’ democratic participation, and deny 
them their civil and political rights. Patrimonialism is entrenched in Arab states where 
the leader appoints friends and relatives in political institutions to protect against any 
opposition movement or revolution (Bellin 2004). Political elites in the Middle East 
manipulate their positions in formal state institutions to maintain access to informal 
forms of governance and resources thus co-opting specific society factions that will 
support the existing regime (Heydemann 2007). 
Created by sectarian elites, Lebanon’s political institutions are not only weak but 
highly corrupt. Lebanon’s sectarian culture has been created throughout history to serve 
the political elites’ interests. It has thus entrenched clientelist networks that serve as one 
of the main pillars for the reproduction of sectarian elites’ political power (Traboulsi 
2007). Politicians tend to appoint sectarian bureaucrats in order to preserve their 
interests and guarantee political support. These patron-client networks have embedded 
sectarian divisions in the country, thus leading to a constant state of conflict. Through 
these networks, political leaders hinder citizens’ democratic participation beyond 
sectarian identities. This clientelist relationship between the leader and his supporters, 
however, is unequal since the former controls access to power whereas the resources of 
the latter amount merely to the votes of his family and himself (Johnson 1986). 
Citizenship in Lebanon is thus defined through sectarian identities where the individual 
identifies himself/herself as a member of his/her sect and group rather than country 
(Moubarak 1999). 
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1.2 – Research Questions 
What is the role of the educational system in embedding sectarianism in 
Lebanon? Schools and universities play a vital role in creating a sectarian culture in 
Lebanon. Fawwaz Traboulsi notes that sectarian identities played an important role in 
the educational system during the 1968-1975 period in Lebanon (2007). Students were 
discriminated against according to their sects; rich Christians were favored in exams, 
and educational institutions were dominant in Christian areas. However, sectarian 
identities continue to play a role in educational institutions in postwar Lebanon. Article 
10 of the Lebanese Constitution allows sects to open their own private schools. The Taif 
Accord came as a solution for the fifteen-year civil war and called for unifying history 
and civic education books to decrease political sectarianism and maintain national unity 
in Lebanon.  
Echoing Taif’s request, the Ministry of Education delegated the Educational 
Center for Research and Development (ECRD) to develop a new curricula (Frayha 
2004). In 1997, new civic education textbooks were published and unified history books 
were published later in 2000 (Bashshur 2003). However, the distribution of history 
books was immediately suspended over an argument on a chapter entitled: “They Had 
All Gone and Lebanon Remained: Independence of a Country” (Frayha 2004, 187). 
Some analyzed this title as lumping Arabs with other invaders, and thus suggesting that 
Lebanon is not Arab (Bashshur 2003). A new committee was subsequently formed to 
modify the history book, but it has made no progress. The reformed curricula also 
suspended teaching religion in schools. However, religious education was reinstated in 
the curricula in 1999 due to religious figures’ demands, but without creating unified 
religious books or ones that teach Islam and Christianity (Bashshur 2003). Adnan El-
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Amine suggests that current history books are divided among Christian and Muslim 
political affiliations and do not have a common historical background (2009). 
Moreover, he contends that weak civic education books used in schools do not promote 
a sense of citizenship. 
This research examines the Lebanese educational system to show how it 
strengthens sectarian identities and the postwar sectarian culture. It looks at the debate 
pertaining to a common history and civic education book, and how this reflects and 
entrenches sectarian differences. Between the period of 1996-2001, a number of private 
universities were licensed and new institutions opened due to sectarian and business 
interests (Bashshur 2003). Religious schools create a clientelist system and allow 
political elites to select teachers based on sectarian considerations. Furthermore, the 
different branches of the Lebanese University are based on regional sectarian identities 
instead of uniting students from various sects (Bashshur 2003). Thus, applying 
educational reforms may play an important role in limiting sectarian divisions in the 
country.   
How do personal status laws create sectarian identities and hamper civil rights? 
“Personal status laws were regulated by religious affiliation such that to be Lebanese 
meant to be defined according to religious affiliation” (Makdisi 1996, 5). A newborn 
baby in Lebanon directly inherits his/her father’s sect and has to abide by the rules set 
by his/her sect’s courts. Personal status laws oblige Lebanese citizens to be part of a 
religious group and sect, which hinders freedom of opinion and belief. If one wishes to 
abandon his/her sect, he/she is supposed to change his/her sect to become a member of a 
new sect and personal status laws (UNDP 2009). 
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Different sects in Lebanon follow different personal status laws. Among these 
laws are ones related to marriage, adoption, inheritance, and divorce based on religious 
teachings. Religious courts in Lebanon forbid civil marriage. However, people who 
wish to receive a civil marriage are allowed to do so outside Lebanon, and they then 
follow the civil law of the foreign country in Lebanon (UNDP 2009).  
This thesis highlights how personal status laws hinder the emergence of civic 
identities thus allowing sectarian elites to maintain the patron-client system in Lebanon. 
Current attempts to implement an optional civil personal status law have been hampered 
since present laws maintain the political objectives of sectarian elites. In 1998, former 
Lebanese President Elias El-Hrawi proposed an optional civil personal status law that 
allows civil marriage. Two-thirds of the Cabinet voted for the proposed law, however, 
former Prime Minister Rafic El-Hariri refused to sign the law and it never reached 
Parliament. Thus, the research underscores how sectarian leaders hinder the 
implementation of an optional civil personal status law. 
Finally, is there a solution to this sectarian predicament? What are the possible 
means to achieve successful democratic reforms in Lebanon? The Lebanese civil war 
has made it clear that the confessional sectarian system in Lebanon is not an effective 
political system. This system needs to be abolished and replaced with a secular one. 
Reforms have been advocated since the creation of the Lebanese republic but without 
any major change or political reform. Traboulsi argues that real reforms require 
abolishing the sectarian system, adopting an optional civil personal status law, and 
reforming the electoral system (1997). He defines secularization as separating religious 
institutions from the state which prevents their interference in one another. Ahmad 
Beydoun argues that the Lebanese system is based on mutual fears and interests, thus 
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precluding citizens from establishing a context capable of guaranteeing society’s 
interests (2004). Separating sectarian political interests from the institutions stands as a 
solution since it promotes democratic governance. Bassel Salloukh stresses that 
intersectarian citizenship and democracy in Lebanon can be achieved through dialogue, 
civic engagement, and secular institutions that are not intertwined with neopatrimonial 
networks (2009).   
Two kinds of secularization may be identified in this respect: objective 
secularization and subjective secularization. Peter Berger states that objective 
secularization is the separation of religion from state’s institutions whereas subjective 
secularization is one’s interaction with others and viewing life according to secular 
raison d’être instead of religious laws (as cited in Keyman 2007, 218). “The ostensible 
goal is to urge the Lebanese to abandon their “premodern” loyalties of religion that are 
said to have inhibited the growth of a democratic, civil and secular society” (Makdisi 
1996, 1).  
This thesis argues that overthrowing the confessional system and adopting a 
mixture of objective and subjective secularism is the best solution for a democratic 
Lebanon. Politicians manipulate the system to maintain their political and economic 
interests. The Taif Agreement asserts eradicating political sectarianism and advocates 
not mentioning an individual’s denomination and sect on identity cards (Frayha 2004). 
Taif has a specific mechanism for abolishing the current system and suggests the 
creation of a Senate based on sectarian identities to preserve them (UNDP 2009). If 
secularism is to be adopted, it may end the sectarian division in the country in addition 
to undermining the clientelist system which serves leaders’ interests. Both objective and 
subjective secularization are essential to overcome the sectarian system in Lebanon. 
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Objective secularization would hinder politicians’ patron-client system in Lebanon 
while subjective secularization would limit the conflictual sectarian identities that lead 
to civil wars and sectarian divisions. Traboulsi argues that abolishing the sectarian 
system goes hand in hand with achieving social justice, which can hamper clientelism 
and corruption, and promote economic, political, and social reforms (2011). Democratic 
reform in the country requires major changes in its sectarian institutions and societal 
associations. This will make citizens realize that their primary loyalty must be to their 
country rather than their sects and patrons.  
 
1.3 – Methodology 
The instrumentalist approach may be used to explain the institutional dynamics 
deployed by Lebanon’s sectarian elites. Instrumentalists look at how ethnic 
entrepreneurs mobilize ethnic loyalties and use ethnic conflict to gain power and state 
resources (Salloukh 2011). This approach helps analyze how sectarian leaders exploit 
the system for their own political and economic interests. Rejecting primordial 
explanations of sectarian conflict in Lebanon, the proposed research uses the 
instrumentalist approach to show how sectarian elites create and use sectarian 
institutions to maintain the hold of sectarianism over Lebanese society. 
I base my argument on two case-studies that delineate how institutions – such as 
the educational system and personal status laws – sustain sectarianism in Lebanese 
society. This thesis uses secondary literature examining the Lebanese sectarian culture, 
sectarian institutions, and secularism. It also uses primary sources from different 
Lebanese newspapers (Al-Akhbar, An-Nahar, As-Safir, and The Daily Star). 
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Moreover, this thesis uses material interviews conducted hence to examine the 
impediments faced while seeking to reform the system, and how the educational system 
and personal status laws create a sectarian culture. The interviews were tape-recorded, 
transcribed, and analyzed. They included university professors, a former president of 
the ECRD, members of the Lebanese Association for Educational Studies (LAES), a 
Lebanese intellectual, and human rights activists. Most of those interviewed took part in 
the educational reform process after the Taif Agreement, while others studied the 
sectarian system and personal status laws. Furthermore, I look at specific cases that 
highlight the contest between the sectarian system and any attempts to change it. For 
example, I analyze why the unified history books were not published and how religious 
education was reinstated in the school curricula. I also examine the implications of civil 
laws on civil marriage and why El-Hrawi’s proposed optional civil personal status law 
was not implemented. 
  
1.4 – Map of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The next chapter surveys the Lebanese 
confessional system and how it was historically constructed. The third chapter examines 
the educational system that hinders any form of secular nationalism due to the lack of 
common books and the weak public state university. Chapter four argues that Lebanese 
personal status laws create sectarian identities where each person is obliged to follow 
the laws of a certain sect instead of civil laws. The final chapter summarizes the 
findings and suggests secularization as a solution to the sectarian predicament in 
Lebanon. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE LEBANESE CONFESSIONAL HEGEMONY 
 
“Pity the nation that is full of beliefs and empty of religion…Pity the nation divided into 
fragments, each fragment deeming itself a nation.” 
Gebran Khalil Gebran 
 
2.1 – Introduction 
 The Lebanese political system was shaped during Ottoman rule of Mount 
Lebanon and later the French mandate. However, Lebanon’s independence did not 
change the sectarian system but rather increased it. Sectarian elites have maintained the 
confessional system to gain more power and preserve their political interests. They have 
also created clientelist relationships with their sectarian constituencies and entrenched 
neo-patrimonial networks that hinder democracy. Furthermore, the sectarian system has 
paralyzed Lebanese institutions and weakened the state’s legitimacy. From this 
perspective, the Lebanese people are divided along sectarian lines and their primary 
allegiance is to their sectarian leaders rather than their country. 
 This chapter examines how the Lebanese confessional system has been 
reproduced throughout history. It begins with a general overview about Michel 
Foucault’s work regarding power and subjects and relates it to Lebanese institutions. 
The chapter surveys the literature on the creation of Lebanese sectarianism and how 
sectarian elites maintain the confessional system. It also discusses how the sectarian 
system creates patron-client relationships, an illegitimate state, and corrupt institutions. 
The chapter concludes that the confessional system hinders the development of true 
citizenship and increases sectarian allegiances. 
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2.2 – Power, Institutions, and Subjects 
 Michel Foucault took great interest in the study of power and subjects (1983). 
He contends that there is no autonomous individual or self for the latter is socially 
constructed and is the outcome of power shaping the mind and body. Power is a form of 
oppression that forbids people from acting as they wish and is intertwined with 
freedom; power is practiced where freedom exists (Foucault 1980). Power was initiated 
with the Western Christian Church’s “pastoral power” that exercised power over people 
in the sixteenth century, forced them to confess, and prohibited sex (Foucault 1980). 
Confession constituted acknowledging one’s sins to a specialized person, to a priest in 
this case, to attain atonement (Foucault 1985). It was a way to manage people’s 
sexuality, affirm their Christian faith, and recognize themselves as sinners (Foucault 
1988). Sexuality is thus a result of disciplinary power produced as a means to reject sex 
(Foucault 1980). However, the power of the Church diminished with the emergence of 
the modern state in the eighteenth century (Foucault 1983). Thus, power spread from 
religious institutions to reach the whole society and the state formulated laws to practice 
its power on citizens (Foucault 1983).  
 Influenced by Nietzsche, Foucault perceives the relationship between truth and 
power within the context of struggle (Foucault 1983). Hence, genealogy is the means 
that illuminates the struggles of the subjugated knowledge and represents the 
relationship between power and truth (Foucault 1980). The state imposes its own set of 
rules and laws to prohibit citizens’ freedom and disseminate its own knowledge. State 
institutions construct various “forms of power” that are entrenched in society and mold 
citizens and their behavior (Foucault 1980). This power enables institutions to produce a 
“regime” of truth and disciplines that repress individuals and engender domination 
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systems of man by man (Foucault 1980; Foucault 1983). These institutions enforce 
certain truths that citizens recognize and accept as part of their own identity. Even the 
educational system is capable of imposing a certain kind of power on people where they 
are also taught to discipline themselves (Foucault 2003). Teaching students in schools 
occurs through certain regulations, lessons, and orders that control students through 
power techniques – such as hierarchy, supervision, and punishment (Foucault 1983). 
The teaching system sustains the interests and power networks of the ruling class. 
Individuals thus acknowledge that mere truth is what is approved by the authorities 
(Foucault 1980). One might believe that the judicial system man has created is the best 
way to punish criminals and spread justice. Foucault, on the other hand, argues that the 
notions of punishment and justice are man-made systems that create negative 
circumstances. These institutions impose disciplinary power on people to manage them. 
In this way, powerful institutions are able to “objectivize” citizens and turn them into 
subjugated subjects (Foucault 1983). Truth is thus a product of discourses and a 
reflection of political power. However, the main quandary today is to free ourselves and 
the truth from the state and its power networks (Foucault 1983). Foucault best describes 
when he notes that “Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to 
refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of 
this kind of political “double bind,” which is the simultaneous individualization and 
totalization of modern power structures” (1983, 134). 
 Similarly, Lebanese institutions are able to objectivize the Lebanese citizens and 
make them clients to their sectarian leaders. Powerful institutions – such as the 
educational system and personal status laws – force citizens to view themselves and 
others through sectarian identities and be part of a sectarian group. In addition, 
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Lebanese leaders mobilize citizens’ loyalties through a patron-client system to maintain 
their own political and economic interests. The sectarian system in Lebanon satisfies the 
needs of political elites who are not willing to make any substantial changes and prevent 
endeavors to enhance these institutions. If we critically question ourselves about certain 
‘truths’, we may then liberate ourselves from the power relations in our society. We 
thus have to scrutinize the ‘truths’ that our sectarian leaders have imposed upon us. 
Lebanese citizens have to become aware that obeying sectarian leaders is not the only 
option they have, but that they can reject conformity, rebel against traditions, and 
liberate themselves. There should be no authority that discriminates between people 
according to their sectarian affiliations. 
Politicians manipulate the sectarian discourse to mobilize their followers and 
maintain the clientelist system (Salloukh 2006). They seek to increase the number of 
their supporters by playing on the latter’s emotions and sectarian identity. Lisa Weeden 
asserts that an authoritarian regime’s power is in its ability to enforce obedience and 
make people complicit, through the use of images, a mechanism of coercion (1998).  
Similarly, Lebanese politicians harness sectarianism to maintain their interests and 
mobilize their constituencies. The sectarian discourse demonizes the other, thus 
mobilizing sectarian identities and sanctioning sectarian violence. This makes people 
view their society only through a sectarian prism that creates disparities among citizens. 
Lebanese people have become programmed robots who often follow political sectarian 
groups in order to preserve their sectarian identity in the face of ‘other’ Lebanese. In 
this way, citizens become members of a sect where they abide by its rules and dismiss 
‘others’ who threaten their identity. Lebanese citizens have stopped questioning 
themselves about the leaders they follow and their actions. They will never be free 
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unless they realize they are imprisoned by a sectarian culture and clientelist leaders. 
Thus, Foucault’s critical thinking is the remedy to our sleeping minds and the 
backwardness of the Lebanese society. He urges us to think about all the ‘truths’ we 
take for granted to liberate ourselves from the ‘regimes of truth’ that suffocate us. 
 
2.3 – Lebanese Sectarianism: A Review of the Literature 
Many researchers have examined the origins of sectarianism in Lebanon (Daher 
1981; Makdisi 2000; Ziadeh 2006), the causes of the civil war (Krayem 1997; El 
Khazen 2000; Khalaf 2002; Trabousli 2007), the political system and the electoral law 
(Hudson 1985; Maila 1992; Salam 2004; Beydoun 2004; Salloukh 2006), and the 
clientelist system (Hottinger 1966; Khalaf 1977; Johnson 1986). Mohammad Jawad 
Moghnieh (1964), Beydoun (1999), and Aref Zayd El-Zein (2010a; 2010b) examine 
personal status laws and civil marriage, while Munir Bashshur (2003), Nemer Frayha 
(2004), and El-Amine (2009) survey the educational system. However, none of these 
studies look at the interactive impact of institutions on the making of sectarian identity 
and a sectarian culture. 
 Farid El Khazen argues that the Lebanese confessional system is a guarantee of 
Lebanon’s pluralism (2000). El Khazen underscores that this system maintains 
coexistence among sectarian citizens and engenders democracy. Thus, any attempt to 
adopt secularism would disrupt communal cohabitation and impede democracy (El 
Khazen 2000). Samir Khalaf contends that kinship, confessionalism and communalism 
have influenced Lebanon’s primordial political culture and strengthened sectarian 
divisions (2003).  
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On the other hand, Masoud Daher argues that sectarianism in Lebanon was 
caused by internal and external events (1981).  Locally, the Maronite Church and the 
increasing power of its followers in addition to the muqata‘ji system and the socio-
economic conditions reproduced sectarian identities. Externally, colonial powers 
aspired to break down the Ottoman Empire and the millet system in the mid-nineteenth 
century to establish sectarian states. Daher stresses that class-based sectarian powers 
pursued sectarianism to gain more economic profits and maintain their social influence. 
Similarly, Ussama Makdisi argues that sectarianism dates back to the strife between 
Christians and Druze in Mount Lebanon during the nineteenth century (2000). Makdisi 
dispels the political cultural argument and contends that sectarianism is modern and was 
constructed as a form of modern nationalism. Trabousli underscores the historical 
events that reproduced sectarian identities in Lebanon and institutionalized them (2007). 
Traboulsi argues that sectarian leaders sought to abolish cross-sectarian movements in 
their pursuit of economic interests and power.  
 Examining the institutionalization of sectarianism, Janine Clark and Salloukh 
show how sectarian elite strategies consolidate sectarian allegiances and hinder 
intersectarian identities (2011). Salloukh also surveys how sectarian elites use electoral 
laws to maintain the clientelist confessional system (2006). Finally, Lara Khattab also 
demonstrates how sectarian politicians control civil society and weaken the role of 
women’s advocacy non-governmental organizations that seek gender and democratic 
reforms (2010). 
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2.4 – The Formation and Late Consolidation of the Confessional System 
 The creation of Lebanon dates back to the Ottoman Empire and the influence of 
European colonialism. In 1516, the Ottoman Sultan Salim I occupied Syria after 
defeating the Mamluks in the Marj Dabek battle, north of Aleppo (Winter 2010). In the 
seventeenth century, the Ottomans restructured the region, divided it into welayat
1
 and 
four districts,
2
 and assigned notable families to manage local areas (Harik 1990; Winter 
2010). Mount Lebanon was unique with its pluralistic religious communities living 
among each other (Harik 1990). The Ottoman millet system rendered sects to organize 
their affairs – such as their own personal status laws, welfare institutions, and 
educational systems (Johnson 2001). However, the Egyptian occupation of Mount 
Lebanon in 1831 politicized sectarian divisions and a Maronite upheaval in 1840, thus 
leading to the intervention of Western powers (Hess and Bodman 1954). In 1842, 
Mount Lebanon was divided among Muslims supporting the Ottomans and challenging 
the French-Britain colonial powers while Christians, particularly the Maronites, 
supported the Europeans who sought to penetrate the Ottoman system (Daher 1981; 
Makdisi 2000). This European intervention and the Ottoman reforms hardened sectarian 
divisions and led to the collapse of Mount Lebanon’s system (Daher 1981; Makdisi 
2000).  
 Moreover, Druze and Christian elites played a role in igniting religious divisions 
and producing sectarianism in Mount Lebanon. The former system was substituted by 
religious politics and sectarian administration that maintained elites’ interests (Makdisi 
2000). Lebanese citizens became subjugated in terms of religious groups, and personal 
                                                          
1 The welayat were formed in Beirut, Akkar, Tripoli, Saida, Tyre, Marjeoun, Jabal Amel. Each welaya 
was ruled by an Ottoman wali and followed the Sultanate. 
2 The districts were Baalbeck, Bekaa, Hasbayya, and Rashayya. These districts were part of the welaya of 
Damascus.  
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status laws and the electoral system were managed according to sectarian affiliations 
(Makdisi 1996). The Europeans sought to create a new system that would protect 
Maronite interests (Winter 2010). Thus, Lebanon was partitioned between a Maronite 
district and a Druze district, or a qa’immaqamiya,3 and numerous laws were established 
– such as having membership in the representative councils depending upon sectarian 
identities – to alleviate sectarian tensions (Hess and Bodman 1954). However, the 1860 
strife between the Druze and Maronites divided Mount Lebanon along strictly sectarian 
lines and embedded a sectarian culture (Makdisi 2000). 
 On 9 June 1861, the Ottomans and European powers
4
 adopted a Règlement 
Organique or an Organic Law for Lebanon (Zahar 2005). This law transformed 
Lebanon into an autonomous mutasarrifiya divided into seven districts
5
 subject to 
European protection (Johnson 2001). The mutasarrifiya had an Administrative Council
6
 
that included twelve members; two members from each of the Maronites, Shiites, 
Sunnis, Druze, Greek Catholics, and Greek Orthodox (Hess and Bodman 1954). From 
this perspective, sectarianism permeated the mutasarrifiya’s politics, administration, 
taxation, security forces, employment, and judiciary (Ziadeh 2006). In 1864, tensions 
between the Ottoman governor and the Maronites, who were not satisfied with the 
confessional arrangements, necessitated certain changes in the Organic Law and the 
Administrative Council (Zahar 2005). Thus, the Council included twelve members; four 
Maronites, three Druze, two Greek Orthodox, one Sunni, one Shiite, and one Greek 
Catholic (Zahar 2005). The 1861 and 1864 Statutes ended the sectarian turmoil in 
                                                          
3 The qa’immaqamiya was ruled by a qa’immaqam assigned by an Ottoman governor. 
4 The European powers were Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. 
5 The districts were Koura, Batorun, Kiserwan, Maten, Zahle, Shouf, and Jezzine. The mutasarrifiya was 
ruled by a non-Lebanese Christian. The capital of the mutasarrifiya was Baabda and its foreign policy 
was decided by the Sultanate. 
6 The members of the Council used to help the mutasarrif in administering Mount Lebanon. 
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Mount Lebanon (Hess and Bodman 1954). This system was the keystone of the later 
Lebanese confessional political system. 
During World War I, European powers defeated the Ottomans in Palestine and 
the latter withdrew from Lebanon. The 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement
7
 divided the 
Levant among French and British powers, and the League of Nations assigned France to 
rule Lebanon (Johnson 2001; Ziadeh 2006). On 1 September 1920, the French High 
Commissioner General Henri Gouraud declared the creation of Greater Lebanon or 
Grand Liban (Ziadeh 2006).
8
 A confessional system regarding divorce, marriage, and 
inheritance was introduced (Johnson 2001). A Consultative Council of seventeen 
members from different sects was created to assist the governors, after the French 
abolished the Administrative Council in July 1920 (Zahar 2005). In March 1922, a 
Lebanese Representative Council was formed of thirty members elected on a 
confessional basis with respect to each sect’s size (Zahar 2005).  
On 23 May 1926 and due to sectarian tensions over Lebanese identity, the 
French High Commissioner General Henri De Jouvenel declared and implemented the 
Lebanese Constitution,
9
 and the name of modern Lebanon was changed from Greater 
Lebanon to the Lebanese Republic. The Constitution institutionalized the nineteenth 
century confessional system, created a presidential system, and maintained elite 
interests (Harik 1990; Ziadeh 2006). Article 9 of the Constitution stated: “Liberty of 
                                                          
7 The Agreement was made between the British Sir Mark Sykes and the French diplomat François 
Georges-Picot. The mandate was put in action in the San Remo conference on 19-26 April 1920 in Italy, 
with the presence of France, Britain, Italy, and Japan.  
8 Greater Lebanon’s area increased from 3500km² to 10452km² after including the welayat of Beirut, 
Tripoli, Saida, and Tyre, the mutasarrifiya, and the four districts (Hasbayya, Rashayya, Baalbeck, and 
Bekaa). The capital of Greater Lebanon became Beirut, instead of Baabda. It gained large valleys: Bekaa, 
Akkar, Marjeoun, and coastal valleys, which hindered famine. It also gained antiquated places: Baalbeck, 
Tripoli, Saida, and Tyre, which increased Greater Lebanon’s touristic value. The ports of Beirut, Tripoli, 
Saida, and Tyre were added, which connected Greater Lebanon with the outer world. 
9 The Lebanese Constitution was established due to Lebanese demands and France’s fear that the 1925 
Syrian revolution would extend to Lebanon. The League of Nations also requested the establishment of a 
Constitution for Lebanon within three years from the beginning of the mandate.  
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conscience is absolute. By rendering homage to the Almighty, the State respects all 
creeds and guarantees and protects their free exercise, on condition that they do not 
interfere with public order. It equally guarantees to individuals, whatever their religious 
allegiance, the respect of their personal status and their religious interests” (Ziadeh 
2006, 87). Article 10 indicated: “Education is free insofar as it is not contrary to public 
order and morals and does not interfere with the dignity of any of the religions or 
creeds. There shall be no violation of the right of religious communities to have their 
own schools provided they follow the general rules issued by the state regulating public 
instruction” (Ziadeh 2006, 229). On the other hand, Article 12 asserted: “All Lebanese 
citizens are equally admitted to all public functions without any other cause for 
preference except their merit and competence and according to the conditions set by 
law. A special statute shall govern Civil Servants according to the administrations to 
which they belong” (Ziadeh 2006, 87). Yet, Article 95 of the 1926 Constitution 
emphasized: “As a transitory measure and in conformity with article 1 of the Charter of 
the Mandate and with intent for justice and concord, the communities shall be equally 
represented in public posts and in ministerial composition, without however any 
damage to the welfare of the State resulting therefrom” (Ziadeh 2006, 87). These 
articles of the 1926 Constitution entrenched confessional representation in state 
institutions and gave numerous privileges to sects. Furthermore, the legislative branch 
of the Lebanese Republic constituted the Parliament and the Senate
10
 which included 
sixteen sectarian members: five Maronites, three Shiites, three Sunnis, two Greek 
Orthodox, one Druze, one Greek Catholic, and one minority rites (Hess and Bodman 
1954). In this way, sectarianism became embedded in the Lebanese Constitution and its 
                                                          
10 The Senate was abolished on 17 October 1927 and was merged with the Parliament. 
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institutions. This gave more power to sectarian leaders who sought to increase their 
privileges and influence. 
On 26 November 1941, the French General Georges Catroux announced 
Lebanon’s independence. However, this independence was only symbolic and different 
Lebanese sects demanded an actual independence. On 18 March 1943, Catroux declared 
the revival of Constitutional life which paved the way for genuine independence, after 
the election of President Bishara Al-Khoury and assigning Prime Minister Riad El-Solh. 
Throughout history, the confessional system became entrenched in the Lebanese 
political system, but it was the 1943 National Pact that basically institutionalized it 
(Krayem 1997).  
The National Pact was an oral agreement between Al-Khoury and El-Solh. It 
was based on the consensus that the President of Lebanon should be Maronite, the 
Prime Minister a Sunni, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shiite (Maila 1992). This Pact 
established ninety nine parliamentary seats based on a confessional ratio of six 
Christians to every five Muslims; fifty four seats were given to Christians while 
Muslims had forty five seats (Mallat 1990; Krayem 1997). Thus, the National Pact 
institutionalized sectarianism in Lebanon and shaped religious loyalties that impede 
secularism and nationalism (Makdisi 1996). 
On 8 November 1943, El-Solh announced in the governmental declaration that 
“One of the fundamental reforms that are required by Lebanon’s national interest 
concerns the treatment of communalism and putting an end to its negative effects” 
(Ziadeh 2006, 110). Thus, the government amended or canceled nine constitutional 
articles that violate Lebanon’s independence; Articles 1, 11, 52, and 102 were amended 
while Articles 90, 91, 92, 94, and 95 were abolished (Ziadeh 2006, 112). However, 
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Articles 9 and 10 of the 1926 Constitution remained the same to protect the right of 
communities to perform their religious and educational affairs without state 
intervention, whereas Article 95 was amended by only removing the phrase “and in 
conformity with article 1 of the Charter of the Mandate” (Zahar 2005; Ziadeh 2006, 
240). This shows how Lebanese elites did not change articles related to confessional 
representation and sects’ rights but rather reproduced them to maintain their interests. In 
1944, France surrendered and submitted its economic privileges to Lebanon and Syria, 
followed by its military forces on 1 August 1945. On 31 December 1946, the last 
foreign soldier evacuated Lebanon. However, this real independence did not improve 
the Lebanese sectarian system or allow the government to freely amend constitutional 
articles. 
In 1975, however, various internal and external factors comprised to create the 
Lebanese civil war. The war ended with the signing of the Taif Agreement
 
on October 
22, 1989 in Saudi Arabia. The Agreement was a product of earlier agreements such as 
the Constitutional Document approved by President Franjieh in 1976, proposals offered 
in Geneva in 1983 and in Lausanne in 1984, the national unity governmental declaration 
of Prime Minister in 1984, and the Tripartite Agreement in 1985 (Krayem 1997). It was 
a compromise between all Lebanese political adversaries and was a package deal that 
created a new formula for Lebanon to end its internal war and regain political stability 
(Krayem 1997).  
The Taif Agreement marked the birth of a new Lebanese Republic, ended the 
protracted civil war, and initiated state sovereignty, national identity, and political 
reforms (Khalaf 2002). Taif asserted Lebanon’s political system as a parliamentary 
democracy with the separation of its branches. It proposed making the mohafaza the 
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electoral district while increasing the number of parliamentary seats to 108 to achieve 
equal seats between Christian and Muslim deputies (Mallat 1990; Salloukh 2006). Taif 
also advocated the gradual deconfessionalization of Lebanese political sectarianism but 
without setting a timetable. A future elected Parliament of equal Muslim and Christian 
representation is responsible for achieving deconfessionalism in addition to forming a 
National Committee that should propose possible means to abolish political 
sectarianism (Ziadeh 2006). Furthermore, Taif recommended replacing sectarian 
representation in public agencies, security, military, judiciary, and public service posts 
by competence and expertise, while having equal Muslim and Christian representation 
in Grade One positions and their equivalents (Ziadeh 2006). Moreover, upon the 
election of the first national non-sectarian Parliament, Taif requested the formation of a 
Senate that represents all sects. It also urged removing the sect and confession from 
identity cards (Ziadeh 2006). 
After Taif, the Lebanese Constitution was amended in 1990. In its Preamble, 
point H of the Constitution stated: “The abolition of political communalism is an 
essential national priority, for the realization of which it is necessary to proceed in 
accordance to a several staged plan” (Ziadeh 2006, 128). Article 19 of 1927 that gave 
Parliament the right to approve laws before being published was amended in 1990 to 
indicate: “A Constitutional Council is established to supervise the constitutionality of 
laws and to arbitrate conflicts that arise from parliamentary and presidential elections. 
The President, the President of the Parliament, the Prime Minister, along with any ten 
Members of Parliament, have the right to consult this Council on matters that relate to 
the constitutionality of laws. The officially recognized heads of religious communities 
have the right to consult this Council only on laws relating to personal status, the 
 22 
 
freedom of belief and religious practice, and the freedom of religious education. The 
rules governing the organization, operation, composition, and modes of appeal of the 
Council are decided by a special law” (Ziadeh 2006, 244). Article 95 was also amended 
to incorporate Taif’s recommendations on abolishing political sectarianism.  
However, Taif has not been implemented as promised. Law 154 of 1992 
increased the Taif Agreement’s 108 parliamentary seats to 128 (Salloukh 2006). Since 
Taif, politicians have not initiated any measures to eradicate political sectarianism or 
achieve the aspired reforms. The Senate has not been formed yet, the National 
Committee has not been assigned, the electoral system has not been reformed, the sect 
is still mentioned on identity cards, and confessional representation still prevails. 
Moreover, Articles 9 and 10 of the 1926 Constitution have not been amended which 
violate the principle of abolishing political sectarianism. The Taif Agreement has not 
been able to maintain a stable political formula. Rather than diminishing political 
sectarianism and the confessional system, Taif has established this system and led to 
both administrative and political paralysis. It merely transformed the 1943 National Pact 
from an oral agreement into a written document. Kamal Salibi argues that “there are no 
major differences in essence between the National Pact of 1943 and Taif… The 
philosophy behind the Taif Agreement and the way it was achieved was Lebanese. It 
was a Lebanese formula similar to the formula that was born in 1943” (1992, 6).  
The 1990 Constitution shows how sectarian elites manipulated the law to 
maintain more privileges. Adding the principle of eradicating political sectarianism does 
not ensure that sectarian elites would abide by it or utilize certain strategies to ensure 
their hegemony. Articles 9, 10, and 19 of the Constitution prove how sects seek more 
influence and control. Hence, the Lebanese postwar political system stresses the 
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sectarian identities of Mount Lebanon, Greater Lebanon, and the 1926 and 1943 
Lebanon. This system has strengthened sectarian institutions and allowed sectarian 
elites to manipulate the state. 
The Lebanese confessional system divides administrative and political positions 
among major sects in the country. Allocating the three main state positions – the 
President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of the Parliament – among the 
Maronites, Sunnis, and Shiites respectively – makes Lebanon a case of corporate 
consociation that privileges accommodated sectarian groups and excludes others 
(Lijphart 1990; McGarry and O’Leary 2007). However, such a system is unable to adapt 
to demographic changes. Before the Taif Agreement, Christians had more parliamentary 
seats than other communities even though they were not the majority of the Lebanese 
(McGarry and O’Leary 2007). The Lebanese confessional system is thus a contract 
between sects to sustain their involvement in political, social, and international 
networks (Beydoun 2004). Lebanese sects organize the relation among the state and 
religion, and each sectarian leader represents his sect toward other sects and the state 
(UNDP 2009). However, each sect seeks to augment its political power, enjoy more 
privileges, and control more state institutions (UNDP 2009).  
On 30 January 2010, former Lebanese Minister of Labor Boutrous Harb 
proposed a draft law that prevents selling property between Muslim and Christian 
Lebanese citizens for fifteen years. Harb justified that his draft law protects national 
coexistence and is a reaction to fears that land sales from different religious members 
would affect the demographic equilibrium in Lebanon (Aleiq 2010). Some politicians 
criticized Harb’s draft law. They asserted it would augment sectarian divisions in the 
country and violate the Constitution while others supported it because it would protect 
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Christian areas from the suspicious transactions that would force them out of specific 
Lebanese areas (Sakr 2011). Ironically, Member of Parliament Walid Junblat advocated 
the formation of “a Christian committee that would buy the lands that are being put to 
sale by other Christians in Lebanon,” but criticized Harb’s draft law and called it 
‘insane’ (The Daily Star 2010; Aleiq 2010). This draft law is another example of how 
sectarian elites seek to maintain the confessional system in Lebanon through 
manipulative ways and under the cover of protecting national coexistence of different 
sects. Such a law would only strengthen sectarian divisions in an already divided 
society. Instead of searching for realistic solutions for Lebanon’s predicament and 
finding ways to reform the country, sectarian elites utilize various methods to augment 
this sectarian quandary that could prohibit the Lebanese from living in peace and 
harmony among each other and could engender future civil wars due to the fear of the 
sectarian ‘other’. To this end, sectarian leaders are capable of implementing a clientelist 
system that serves their interests.  
 
2.5 – The Clientelist System: The Za‘im and his Clients 
The Lebanese confessional system entrenches a clientelist system by which 
political leaders control citizens and hinder their civil participation. Clientelism is a 
political system based upon a mutual relation between a patron who offers protections 
and favors, and a client who offers his allegiance and support (Weingrod 1977; 
Gilsenan 1977). Patronage is a form of power relations since the patrons’ power 
increases if they control more resources and more clients (Weingrod 1977; Gilsenan 
1977). As the degree of state centralization, control over laws, and citizens’ access to 
state resources increases, the degree of patronage decreases (Gilsenan 1977). Thus, 
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patron-client relations occur mostly in weak states that lack social control (Gellner 
1977; Midgal 1988). The relationship between patrons and clients is dyadic: clients seek 
benefits, protection, and security from their patrons, whereas patrons seek augmenting 
their clientage (Khalaf 1977). Patrons are more dependent upon their clients since they 
prolong the clientelist system to remain in power, however, clients can end this 
relationship if they find other ways for pursuing their ends (Waterbury 1977).  
Patron-client relations can take several forms and have numerous means to show 
leaders’ and clients’ support to one another. Clients can vote for their leaders or zu‘ama 
in elections and fight or even die for them during wars while the zu‘ama can sustain this 
support by offering services to their clients and fight electoral opponents to preserve 
their administrative positions (Johnson 1977; Traboulsi 2007). Furthermore, the za‘im 
plays the role of the mediator between his clientele and the government (Hottinger 
1966). The government can reach any community via its za‘im while his clientele deem 
him indispensible since he links them with the government, guarantees peace between 
them and others, and offers them services (Hottinger 1966). Three kinds of clients can 
be identified: those who are rich and give the za‘im electoral and financial support, 
poorer clients who can only vote for the za‘im, and those who vote in a different 
constituency or are not enfranchised (Johnson 1977). 
From this perspective, the Lebanese system has been a victim of clientelist 
networks and a coalition of political patrons to maintain selfish interests and the 
survival of sectarian communities. Politicians form interconfessional coalitions, during 
election times, to recruit various sectarian clients and maintain their privileges. The 
electoral system in Lebanon entrenches clientelism and hampers national political 
agendas. Salloukh argues that “interethnic alliances in postwar Lebanon have instead 
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institutionalized the clientelistic confessional political system, serving the interests of 
ethnic rather than national politicians, and concomitantly hardening sectarian animosity 
and robbing the electoral process of its prewar contestatory dynamics” (2006, 650). 
During elections period, Lebanese leaders use “competitive clientelism” to compete 
amongst one another in their pursuit to gain access to state resources and embed 
patronage (Lust 2009). Thus, voters elect these leaders to benefit from the available 
resources in addition to other services (Lust 2009). Moreover, campaign finance and 
sectarian media outlets play a vital role in Lebanese elections. Wealthy leaders can buy 
electoral votes, utilize media campaigns for their benefit, and offer social or charitable 
activities (El-Hoss 2010a). Most of the political leaders pay money to their clients to 
vote for them on elections day. Usually, half of the amount of the money is given 
beforehand and the second half is given after elections day to ensure that clients vote for 
their patron. Other than vote buying, politicians use certain methods – such as 
intimidation – to mobilize their followers (Johnson 1986). 
Hence, Lebanese clientelism “will not be an easy death, because politicians have 
built machines that not only exploit individualism, but also encourage its persistence” 
(Johnson 1977, 208). The political system supports the existence of a clientelist system, 
where sectarian elites provide economic and social services to voters in exchange for 
their support. Being elected over and over again makes some families resilient in the 
Lebanese political system. If the first elected person in the family passes away, then his 
son or daughter or brother or even his wife take over his seat and perform his functions. 
Confessional citizens often support a certain political leader in order to maintain the 
privileges, favors, and services they want – services that in theory should be equally 
offered to all the citizens. Citizens also follow an elected leader based on his sectarian 
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identity rather than his political program or political platform to guarantee the power of 
the sect over other sects. Besides, leaders recruit qabadayat or strong-arm men to 
organize clients and carry out the leader’s ‘dirty’ work during war and crisis (Johnson 
2001).  
In addition, sectarian elites are able to provide protection and services to their 
clients due to their powerful positions. The system is thus corrupt since citizens are 
overwhelmed by power and cannot criticize their sectarian leaders. They are also unable 
to hold their leaders accountable due to the services they are receiving from them. This 
makes a citizen part of a group that identifies him according to his neopatrimonial 
networks (Rosen 2006). Politicians try to offer as many services as possible to entrench 
their patronage, receive more votes, and mobilize more constituencies. However, most 
zu‘amas benefit their clients to protect personal and sectarian privileges. It is worth 
noting that it is hard for a citizen to sustain essential services without having a wasita or 
a recommendation from a sectarian leader who – via his connections and power – 
ensures that his client gets the aspired service in exchange for loyalty. Thus, it is 
essential to use a za‘im’s wasita in order to be employed or promoted, to get medical 
care, enroll children in school, or deal with state institutions (Johnson 1986). In this 
sense, citizens receive services from their sectarian leaders rather than the state. 
Currently, there are several national patrons or zu‘ama for each community in 
Lebanon. Some of these sectarian leaders inherited their positions and sects’ control 
from their fathers, and need access to state resources to maintain their power. Saad El-
Hariri, the main Sunni leader, inherited his leadership after the assassination of his 
father Rafic in 2005. Walid Junblat, the main leader of the Druze, inherited his position 
after the assassination of his father Kamal in 1977. Talal Irslan is also another Druze 
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leader who inherited his leadership from his father Majid after the latter’s death in 1983. 
Amine El-Gemayel, a Christian leader, inherited his position after the assassination of 
his brother Bashir in 1982. 
Nonetheless, other sectarian leaders entered the ruling class after being warlords 
during the Lebanese civil war. The main Shiite leaders Nabih Berri and Hassan 
Nasrallah gained their leadership during the civil war and fighting against Israel. As for 
the Christians, both Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea played an important role during the 
civil war. Rather than trying to fix the situation and find a remedy for the conflict, 
sectarian leaders mobilized more supporters and constituencies to serve their own 
interests and gain more power to protect their sect from other sects. To our day, these 
sectarian elites maintain their political positions and consider themselves war heroes 
due to the high amounts of casualties they produced. Intraconfessional leaders even 
compete amongst one another in their attempt to drive solo and become the mere 
leaders of their sect. 
In addition to national leaders, there are some local zu’ama whose power is 
limited to a certain city or town – such as Omar Karami of Tripoli who became a leader 
after the assassination of his brother Rashid in 1987. Suleiman Franjieh Junior of 
Zgharta also inherited his position after his father Tony was assassinated in 1978 and 
his grandfather Suleiman passed away in 1992. Furthermore, Ossama Saad of Saida 
became a leader after the death of his brother Mustafa in 2002. 
To institutionalize this strong clientelist system, numerous associations, ranging 
from hospitals and schools to mosques and churches, offer services to sectarian citizens 
(Salem 1999). In this way, Lebanese politicians manage institutions to ensure that the 
sectarian regime prevails. Among these sectarian organizations is the Hariri Foundation 
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that provides several services to citizens – such as education and health services. Until 
June 2003, this foundation helped 31,614 Lebanese students from different religious 
backgrounds to pursue their education (Baalbaki 2009). There are also different 
foundations where sectarian elites provide numerous services to the orphans and the 
disadvantaged. Among these foundations are the Safadi Foundation, the Makassed 
Philanthropic Islamic Association of Beirut, Imam Sadr Foundation, Makhzomi 
Foundation, Al-Mabarrat Association, Social Welfare Institutions, Caritas Lebanon, and 
René Moawad Foundation, etc… Sectarian leaders use these institutions as a way to 
embed clientelism and provide services to their followers. All of these associations help 
the poor and needy to gain their loyalty through clientelist institutions. But the question 
raised is: How do state institutions maintain their legitimacy in the presence of 
clientelist leaders and a sectarian system? 
 
2.6 – State Legitimacy and Corrupt Institutions 
The Lebanese confessional system lost its legitimacy the moment it was born. 
The system merely creates civil strife and instability among Lebanese people. The 
country has failed to achieve a legitimate system based on power-sharing due to 
sectarian identities that control the state (Hudson 1988). Lebanon’s institutions are 
permeated by neopatrimonialism, which impedes the development of national loyalties. 
This also allows political leaders to appoint their clientelist bureaucrats in state 
institutions to preserve the leaders’ interests. The Lebanese Parliament is not a 
representation of citizens’ needs as much as it is a representation of lingering clientelist 
privileges. The best formula that delineates the Lebanese government is: by sectarian 
leaders, for the sectarian leaders, and of the sectarian leaders. It is worth noting that 
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some appointed bureaucrats do not offer services to citizens unless they receive a bribe 
or the person has a wasita from a sectarian leader. This hinders the emergence of 
democratic institutions, and leads to an illegitimate system based on nepotism and 
despotism. Lebanese institutions thus create high ‘levels of distrust’ which hinder their 
legitimacy (Jamal 2007). The more clientelist networks permeate state institutions, the 
more the levels of trust decrease and Lebanese institutions fail to serve people’s needs. 
Where legitimacy perishes, corruption prevails. Corruption is seeking gains by 
abusing authority, money, or doing illegitimate acts. Lebanon ranks twelve among 
corrupt Arab countries and ranks 130
th
 internationally (El-Hoss 2010b). Corruption 
pervades Lebanese institutions and has its own mechanisms for stealing public money 
and gaining more illegitimate profits (Suleiman 2003). Sectarianism has created a 
corrupt system that only serves the interests of political leaders and protects them from 
punishment. The system “too often serves as a bulwark for corruption, precluding the 
prosecution of sectarian leaders for corruption-related perpetrations, as any charges are 
effectively portrayed as assaults against the sectarian community of the culprit” (El-
Hoss 2010c, 301-302). These leaders utilize the confessional system to protect 
themselves and maintain more interests, thus sectarianism is used to impede serving the 
public interest and maintains corruption (Suleiman 2003). After the implementation of 
the 1992 constitutional reforms, corruption increased and paralyzed the country (Mattar 
2004). Salim El-Hoss’s government sought to prosecute numerous political leaders and 
civil servants for abusing public funds, however, these attempts failed due to political 
pressure (Mattar 2004). The confessional system is thus unable to offer democratic state 
institutions. “What is seriously undermining democratic governance, the state and its 
institutions is the overlap between business, clientelist and sectarian interests to the 
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extent that all attempts to reform the system are perceived or discussed as attempts to 
“take away” the privileges of one community or the other” (UNDP 2009, 29). Talal 
Salman contends that no state can be established as long as the Lebanese are supporters 
of sectarian leaders. Furthermore, the Lebanese Constitution stresses the separation of 
the legislative, judicial, and executive government branches. However, this does not 
seem to be the case by practice (2011). The Minister of Justice interferes in judicial 
issues and some parliamentarians are also ministers (El-Hoss 2010b). This overlap of 
state branches increases corruption and hinders democracy.  
One clear example of the overlap between sectarianism and corruption is the 
clash between former Minister of Telecommunications Charbel Nahhas, and General 
Director of the Internal Security Forces Ashraf Rifi. On 26 May 2011, more than fifty 
armed forces, under the supervision of Rifi and at Ogero’s General Director 
Abdelmonem Youssef’s orders, Nahhas was prevented from entering the ministry to lay 
his hands on a Chinese telecommunications network offered to Lebanon in 2007 (As-
Safir 2011). The former Minister of Interior and Municipalities Ziad Baroud ordered the 
Internal Security Forces to leave the building but they refused to do so (As-Safir 2011). 
While Rifi and Youssef were protected from the former Prime Minister Saad El-Hariri, 
Nahhas was supported by Member of Parliament General Michel Aoun. However, due 
to his non-partisan status, Baroud was protected by no one. The state has thus collapsed 
to be distributed among the sectarian and confessional powers in the country (Salman 
2011). This delineates how the state and its institutions remain a source of conflict 
among sectarian leaders in their pursuit for more privileges and authority. 
Corruption is thus rampant in Lebanon due to sectarian leaders’ control over 
public institutions. It has become entrenched in people’s minds where it impedes 
 32 
 
economic, administrative, human, and political development (Mattar 2004). Moreover, 
the lack of whistleblowers or anti-corruption techniques augments the level of 
corruption in Lebanon (El-Hoss 2010b). Accountability plays an important role in 
fighting corruption and repressing it. If violators are not held accountable or get 
punished, they will continue with their illegitimate and corrupt acts. The more time we 
spend without a legitimate state and reformed institutions, corruption will remain the 
president of Lebanon. As long as the sectarian system prevails, sectarian leaders will 
continue to take advantage of the corrupt and illegitimate state institutions. This 
emphasizes how politicians manipulate institutions to remain in power. Lebanon is thus 
a state of sectarian leaders fighting among one another to gain more power without any 
consideration of state laws. Sectarian leaders act as the primary dynamo of Lebanon and 
have more power than the state itself. From this perspective, they entrench a clientelist 
system where citizens become loyal to them rather than the country. 
 
2.7 – Conclusion: Lebanese Citizenship or Sectarian Loyalty? 
 In a clientelist sectarian country like Lebanon, citizenship is hardly found due to 
the presence of multisectarian allegiances. Citizenship is the relationship between a 
citizen and his/her state where the former practices his/her rights and duties according to 
the law. It is the individual’s political, social, legal, and cultural interactions with 
society and political institutions. However, Lebanese people are loyal to their sectarian 
groups and leaders instead of their country and its institutions. There is no collective 
national Lebanese identity but rather there are eighteen sectarian identities where each 
one of them interprets Lebanon and its history differently. Moreover, Lebanon’s 
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consociational democracy makes individuals prefer their group identity more than the 
national one (Moubarak 1999). 
Sectarian identities also emerge as an ideological means to rationalize self-
interested politics (Telhami and Barnett 2002). In this sense, Lebanese sectarian leaders 
utilize sectarian discourse to gather more supporters and maintain their posts. 
Furthermore, the sectarian electoral system serves the interests of sectarian political 
actors instead of national ones. This system weakens patriotism and undermines 
national loyalty since it produces a dual allegiance to the sect and the state (El-Khalil 
1988). It also impedes national unity and hinders the formation of a democratic system.  
Loyalty to the sect is socially and culturally constructed and thus can be altered 
to tolerate the ‘other’ and view differences as a cultural multiplicity. One’s sectarian 
loyalty should complement his/her loyalty to his/her country and no sect should 
undermine another sect’s loyalty. The next chapter shows how sectarian elites control 
education. It investigates how the educational system perpetuates sectarian allegiances 
and impedes the formation of a national citizen who is loyal to his/her country. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EMBEDDED SECTARIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
 
“Education is a better safeguard of liberty than a standing army.” 
Edward Everett 
 
3.1 – Introduction 
 Parents, the state, religious men and their institutions, and educators determine 
the quality of education students receive (Bashshur 1999). In Lebanon, the educational 
system witnesses a clash between religious men and the state. Lebanese education is 
based on a secular system, yet Article 10 of the Constitution permits sectarian groups to 
open their own religious schools. This has made sectarian leaders enjoy substantial 
freedom in managing their private schools and universities (Harik 1999). This 
educational freedom dates back to World War I, when Mount Lebanon was under the 
rule of the Ottoman Empire (Kobeissy 1999). 
 This chapter investigates how sectarianism is institutionalized in the Lebanese 
educational system. It focuses on how the educational system creates a sectarian culture 
and perpetuates sectarian identities. The chapter begins with a discussion of the 
establishment of the first private sectarian schools during the Ottoman Empire. It shows 
how the Constitution gives privileges to sectarian groups and emphasizes the Taif 
Agreement’s recommendations to reform the educational system. Furthermore, the 
chapter analyzes why most parents send their children to sectarian schools having their 
same sectarian affiliation. It also examines how sectarian elites manipulate the history, 
civic education, and religious education subjects taught in schools to embed sectarian 
allegiances. Moreover, it looks at how sectarian elites hinder the formation of a national 
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Lebanese University by establishing numerous branches. The chapter concludes that 
sectarian elites hinder educational reforms to serve their own privileges. 
  
3.2 – Education: From the Ottomans to the Lebanese State  
In 1535 and under the pretext of commercial protection, France and the Ottoman 
Empire signed an agreement that gave the former privileges to protect the Christians 
living under the Ottoman rule, and renewed it in 1673 and 1740 (Kobeissy 1999; 
Bahous et al. 2010). In 1636, the French opened the first private school in Mount 
Lebanon followed by the first French Jesuit missionaries’ school in 1734 (Bahous et al. 
2010). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, numerous missionaries established 
their schools to teach their religion. In 1846, the Ottomans issued a law that allowed 
sects to open their arts, sciences, and industry schools (Bahous et al. 2010). They then 
issued another law in 1869 that classified schools into public ones administered by the 
state and private ones administered by social groups and individuals (Kobeissy 1999; 
Bahous et al. 2010). American Presbyterians established the Syrian Protestant College 
(currently known as the American University of Beirut) in 1866 and the French Jesuits 
opened the Saint Joseph College (currently known as the University of Saint Joseph) in 
1875 (Kobeissy 1999). The Americans opened around one hundred thirty-two schools, 
the British-Syrian missionaries established forty schools before World War I, the 
French Jesuits were also active, and the Muslims opened their own schools but in lesser 
amounts than the Christians (Frayha 2004). The French hardened this principle by 
supporting foreign missionaries and private groups to open schools, under the pretext of 
protecting Christians from the Ottoman Empire. This allowed Christians to be 
autonomous in administering their education, while public schools that Muslims 
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attended were neglected (Kobeissy 1999). However, few secular schools were found in 
Mount Lebanon – such as Boutrous Al-Boustani’s school that was established in 1863 
(Kobeissy 1999). 
Foreign education allowed missionaries to cultivate a sectarian educational 
culture and stress students’ allegiances to foreign countries. Lebanese preferred 
missionary and sectarian schools, partly to protect their religious practices, but also 
because public schools used Turkish as the language of instruction.
11
 The latter were 
also viewed as schools for poor Sunnis (Bahous et al. 2010). Missionary schools were 
only present in Christian areas whereas public schools were found in poor Muslim areas 
(Kobeissy 1999). This allowed the emerging of numerous conflicting concepts of 
nationalism, identity, and loyalty among the Muslim and Christian Lebanese who 
attended different schools (Bahous et al. 2010). Muslims paid allegiance to the Ottoman 
Empire while Christians were loyal to France and Britain.  
In 1876, the Ottomans established several public schools to limit religious men’s 
power (Kobeissy 1999). However, these schools had a low educational quality and little 
amount of government aid (Kobeissy 1999). By 1919, all sects had established their 
own schools – whether local or foreign – and educational systems (Bahous et al. 2010). 
In 1919, private schools reached 88.6% of Lebanese schools: 39.2% were foreign 
schools and 49.4% were local schools; public schools did not exceed 11.3% (Kobeissy 
1999).  
The formation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 did not change the existing 
educational system but rather gave more privileges to sects to manage education and 
empower their institutions. Each sectarian group provided its students with selected 
                                                          
11 The Arabic language was added to the public schools’ curricula in 1913. 
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knowledge and values that served the sect’s interests (Kobeissy 1999). In 1943, the 
government amended the educational system as a means to unify the Lebanese people 
(Frayha 2004; Bahous et al. 2010). Numerous legislations were issued to create new 
curricula that strengthened the Arabic language, restructured the Ministry of Education, 
managed private schools, and promoted public schools (Frayha 2004). However, the 
independence government did not change or amend Article 10 of the Constitution. 
Educational curricula were also revised in 1968 and were affected by Arabism and 
leftism. This gave private schools more freedom to promote their perspectives of civic 
allegiance and national identity which in turn had negative effects on Lebanese social 
unity (Frayha 2004). Ogarit Younan, the co-founder of the Lebanese Association for 
Civil Rights (LACR) and the Academic University for Non-Violence and Human 
Rights (AUNOHR) and a human rights activist, asserts: 
The educational system and its schools were the main vein for the presence of 
sects and their power. If sects had not had sectarian schools, Lebanon would 
have been different today. When the Lebanese state was created, these sectarian 
schools became stronger and defeated the state.
12
   
 
Nowadays, the Lebanese government continues to offer public education for 
those who are unable to afford private schooling (Harik 1999). The current educational 
system is divided among public schools that are established and administered by the 
state and offer education from kindergarten to secondary classes, free private schools 
that are non-profit schools established by recognized religious institutions and receive 
financial support from the state and provide education for elementary classes only, and 
private schools that provide education for all classes where parents cover financial 
expenses (Abu Rujeili 1999). Moreover, the number of private universities and schools 
                                                          
12 Ogarit Younan, co-founder of LACR and AUNOHR, and a human rights activist, interview by author, 
29 June, 2011, Beirut, Lebanon. 
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continues to increase in Lebanon. On 13 March 1996, the former Minister of Culture 
and Higher Education Michel Edde requested issuing licenses for numerous new private 
universities and colleges: opening three sectarian universities, transferring two colleges 
into universities, and establishing thirty-five new institutes and colleges (Bashshur 
2003). On 5 October 1996, Presidential Decree No. 9278 approved Edde’s request 
(Bashshur 2003). There was no objection to this decree that violated the criteria of 
establishing new universities and institutions because it served sectarian and business 
interests (Bashshur 2003). Each sect opened more colleges, universities, and institutes 
that allowed it to maintain its sectarian privileges and gain more financial assets. To this 
end, sectarian elites did not raise any objection to the opening of these new educational 
institutions since they all got their share. The following section will explain how the 
Lebanese Constitution preserves sectarian privileges.  
 
3.3 – The Constitution and Sectarian Education 
Article 10 of the Constitution allows religious communities to open their own 
schools. However, it stipulates that groups must follow government policies and not 
affect the freedom of other communities. Yet, this article does not mention the people’s 
right to education which is a universal one and the role of the state in providing 
educational services to at least balance with the private sector. Nor does it call for 
compulsory education that should be provided at the national level.
13
 Younan contends 
that Article 10 gives priority to sects and makes the state secondary, and raises the 
question: “Why should Article 10 remain if there is already a law issued in 1950 that 
                                                          
13 Adnan El-Amine, co-founder of LAES and UNESCO consultant, interview by author, 21 April, 2011, 
Beirut, Lebanon. 
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regulates the opening of private schools?”14 Nemer Frayha, a professor of education and 
former president of the ECRD notes: 
What is amazing about this article is that it has never changed or been amended 
even though the Constitution has been amended many times. It is a kind of a 
common understanding among the politicians to keep religious communities’ 
rights in education, through this article, and thus satisfy their demands.
15
 
 
The current educational system is capable of constructing a sectarian culture 
among students due to the large amount of sectarian private schools. This sectarian 
ambiance is evident in the choice of teachers according to their sectarian identities, or 
the low level of social integration among students from different sects, or in the content 
of education, particularly in the social sciences subjects such as civic education and 
history that play an instrumental role in transferring a sectarian culture.
16
 Moreover, 
since the Lebanese civil war, public schools have lost their autonomy and neutrality to 
become subjugated to sects that educate people on sectarian affiliations and teach them 
religion, even though it is against state laws.
17
 Thus, the educational system perpetuates 
sectarian identities that are present in a constructed sectarian culture and in the sectarian 
system. From this perspective, then, education is the main weapon to creating divided 
sectarian identities that invade the spirit and mind because 
when you teach students to belong to a certain sect and make them get used to a 
specific culture – clothes, greetings, and holidays the school celebrates – this 
creates sectarian identities, especially that the state’s supervision on private 
schools is nil.
18
 
                                                          
14 Ogarit Younan, interview by author, 29 June, 2011, Beirut, Lebanon. 
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 Nemer Frayha, professor of education and former president of the ECRD, interview by author, 28 June, 
2011, Beirut, Lebanon. 
16 Ahmad Beydoun, Lebanese author and former professor of social sciences at LU, interview by author, 
3 May, 2011, Beirut, Lebanon. 
17 Ogarit Younan, interview by author, 29 June, 2011, Beirut, Lebanon. 
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The main problem thus lies in the Lebanese state’s weakness and inability to play a role 
in supervising history and civic education books.
19
 The following section will highlight 
the educational reforms recommended by the Taif Agreement.  
 
3.4 – The Taif Agreement and Educational Reforms 
 Education was considered an indirect cause of the 1975 Lebanese civil war but 
one that can play at the same time an essential factor in Lebanon’s social reconstruction 
(Frayha 2004). In a country that has witnessed a civil war, changing the educational 
curricula is essential. This was ultimately mentioned in the Taif Agreement and 
incorporated into the Constitution.
20
 Moreover, school books are considered to be the 
most crucial characteristic of the curricula since it unites citizens around one ideology, 
spreads knowledge, and contributes to developing one’s country and solving its 
problems (Al-Kayssi et al. 2007).  
 The Taif Agreement stated the necessity of reforming the Lebanese school 
curricula that promotes national integration and stressed unifying the history and civic 
education books. Taif also asserted that education should be mandatory, at least for the 
elementary level, in addition to reforming the Lebanese University, and public technical 
and vocational education. Furthermore, Taif emphasized the protection of private 
education while respecting general state regulations and laws (Frayha 2004). However, 
Taif is unclear about reforming the curricula and maintaining social integration.
21
 It 
does not provide a specific mechanism on what the curricula should include or how it 
should be implemented to achieve integration. Taif also does not set a timetable for 
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 Ogarit Younan, interview by author, 29 June, 2011, Beirut, Lebanon.  
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reforming the curricula or oblige all schools to abide by it. Yet, the Ministry of 
Education assigned the ECRD to create new curricula and books (Frayha 2004).  
In 1994, the government approved the ECRD’s plan which tackled citizenship, 
national belonging, and internal peace (Frayha 2004). It was also agreed that the two 
committees chosen to write history and civic education books would include members 
from all sects so that no religious community is excluded and that books can be used in 
all schools (Frayha 2004). This shows that sectarian identities were considered in the 
educational reform process which might hinder the objectives of the reform process 
where each sect would want to include its own views. Rather than depending on a 
sectarian committee, expertise and professional experience should have been 
considered. In 1995, new subjects – such as arts, technology, economics, computer 
science, civics, sociology, and a second foreign language – were added to the curricula 
(Frayha 2004). On 8 May 1997, Cabinet approved the new curriculum for all subjects 
except history with Presidential Decree No. 10227 (Bashshur 2003). However, the 
1998-1999 reformed curricula were merely mandatory for public schools while private 
schools remained autonomous in choosing their books, except civic education ones 
(Kobeissy 1999; Bahous et al. 2010). This highlights the weakness of the state that is 
unable to supervise the implementation of the curricula. It also emphasizes how 
sectarian private schools did not abide by the reformed curricula and continued to 
disseminate their sectarian knowledge. From this perspective, most parents send their 
children to religious schools having their same sectarian affiliation so that the children 
can obtain their sectarian knowledge and education. 
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3.5 – Parents and Religious Schools 
Since 1949, parents have been sending their children to schools that reflect their 
religious identity (Frayha 2004). After the 1975 civil war, the number of eminent public 
and private schools in Beirut that had students from different backgrounds decreased 
(El-Amine 2009). The demographic changes caused by the civil war hindered social 
integration and increased people’s fear from the sectarian ‘other’. In this sense, citizens 
felt more comfortable in attending schools having their same sectarian affiliations.
22
 
Few students enroll in private schools that differ from their sectarian affiliation because 
they offer better education than public schools with affordable tuition fees (Frayha 
2004). Furthermore, Munir Bashshur, co-founder of LAES and professor of education at 
AUB, argues: 
People in this country are becoming more sectarian and more religious. They 
feel more secure in belonging to a religion than belonging to a state, and their 
religious loyalty gives them more satisfaction. Thus, they enroll in their sectarian 
schools.
23
 
 
Other factors such as residence, school’s policies, and tuition fees also determine which 
schools parents send their children to, however.
24
  
Yet, some Muslims enroll their children in Christian schools while Christians 
rarely do the same (Frayha 2004). Adnan El-Amine, a co-founder of LAES and 
consultant at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) stresses that 
traditionally, Muslims were not used to sending their children to Muslim 
schools. If they did not trust public schools, they sent them to Christian schools 
because they had higher educational standards and due to social expectations. 
                                                          
22 Ogarit Younan, interview by author, 29 June, 2011, Beirut, Lebanon. 
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 Munir Bashshur, co-founder of LAES and professor of education at AUB, interview by author, 26 
April, 2011, Beirut, Lebanon. 
24 Ahmad Beydoun, interview by author, 3 May, 2011, Beirut, Lebanon. 
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They considered Saint Joseph schools as having good quality because they 
taught good French with acceptable prices.
25
  
 
Research shows that public schools encourage tolerance among different 
religious members more than private schools do (Frayha 2004). A study confirms that 
public school students show higher percentage rates of belonging to their country than 
secular and sectarian school students (Alwa 2011). Another study conducted in 1997 
shows that only 7% of Lebanese students were enrolled in religiously and 
geographically mixed schools (El-Amine 2009). 
For the 2009-2010 academic year, the number of Lebanese pre-university 
students was 868,977 divided among 264,899 enrolled in public schools, 121,726 
enrolled in free private schools, 481,183 enrolled in private schools, and 1,169 enrolled 
in the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) schools (ECRD 2010a). 
Currently, 70% of Lebanese students attend private schools while 30% attend public 
ones (Alwa 2011). However, private secular schools are few – such as the International 
College (IC) and the American Community School (ACS) – and thus most Lebanese 
students receive a sectarian education. Consequently, social integration among students 
from different sects decreases and is limited to people who can afford private secular 
schools. Hence, Lebanese schools form and reflect a sectarian culture among citizens 
rather than uniting them. This sectarian culture is also created by the content of religion, 
history, and civic education books taught in different sectarian schools.  
 
3.5.1 – Religious Education 
The educational system in Lebanon was a secular one that did not include 
religion as a subject in its curricula (Nahas 2001). However, the 1946 curricula 
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introduced religion to be taught one hour in elementary and intermediate classes and 
two hours of “Religious Education and Morals” in secondary classes (Nahas 2001, 299). 
Private sectarian schools taught their sects’ or confessions’ religion and made it optional 
for students from other religions to attend these sessions (Nahas 2001). In 1973, 
numerous attempts were undertaken to cancel religious education from the curriculum, 
or replace it with a morals session, however, these attempts reduced religious education 
to once per week (Atrissi 2001).  
After the Taif Agreement, the new 1997 curricula canceled religious education 
but kept it as an elective in public schools to be taught for elementary grades after 
school hours on Sundays and Fridays for two hours (Bashshur 2003; Frayha 2003). 
Muslim and Christian religious men opposed this decision and asked the government to 
include religious education in the curricula for at least one session per week during 
school time (Bashshur 2003; Frayha 2003; Frayha 2004). Religious groups pressured 
the government to adopt their demand. As Bashshur contends: 
This was a very rare occasion when different groups agree. They went back to 
the government and put pressure on it to reinstate the number of hours in the 
curriculum for teaching religion.
26
 
 
This highlights how sectarian elites manipulate the state to maintain their 
interests. Removing religious education from the school curricula threatened all 
sectarian groups who demanded the government to reconsider its decision. On 1 
October 1998, Cabinet issued Decision No. 73 to assign the ECRD to study reinstating 
religious education (Frayha 2003; Frayha 2004). The ECRD thus presented in 1999 the 
idea of teaching comparative religion that would promote national unity instead of 
religious instruction (Frayha 2004). Thus, on 12 November 1999, Cabinet approved 
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adding religion to the public schools’ curricula to be taught once weekly except for third 
secondary classes, starting from the academic year 2000-2001, and delegated the ECRD 
to prepare unified books (Bashshur 2003; Frayha 2003). In this way, the government 
was subjugated to the will of sects who considered that most of their poor sectarian 
students are enrolled in public schools. Including religion as part of the public school’s 
curricula is a 
constitutional violation because public schools belong to the state. If sects unite 
then there will be a unified book. But is the objective of the state to unite sects or 
create an educational curriculum?
27
 
  
Numerous meetings were conducted with the Minister of Education Mohammad 
Beydoun and religious references to agree on the committee members (Frayha 2003). 
The assigned committee included the ECRD president, clergymen representing major 
sects, philosophy or theology specialists, and curriculum development experts from the 
ECRD (Frayha 2004). During the committee meetings, sects wanted to have two 
separate books, one for Muslims and another for Christians (Frayha 2003). The former 
president of the ECRD Nemer Frayha then met with some politicians who supported 
having one unified book for both religions and proposed this to the government (Frayha 
2003; Frayha 2004). Thus, the committee meetings were delayed awaiting a decision 
from Cabinet regarding this issue (Frayha 2003).  
On 10 October 2000, Cabinet announced that elementary classes should have 
two books, but each one of them should include a part that tackles the other religion, 
whereas secondary classes should have one book that tackles both religions and 
specifies a section to show the common values between the two religions, and that the 
ECRD should write these books (Frayha 2003; Bashshur 2003). Yet, after the 
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committee resumed its work, religious men insisted on having two separate books that 
do not mention anything about the other religion due to the difficulty of having one 
teacher who can explain the two religions (Bashshur 2003; Frayha 2003; Frayha 2004). 
Only one Druze sheikh refused having separate books because this would augment 
sectarian divisions in the country (Frayha 2004).  
Consequently, the committee requested a period of three years to publish the 
unified books after Christians endeavor to create their own unified books, and Muslims 
do the same (Bashshur 2003). In 2006, Christians developed a unified book while it still 
seems hard for Muslims to do so.
28
 The reason for not having created a unified Muslim 
book yet is unknown, but it may be that the sectarian cleavages among the Sunnis, 
Shiites, and Druze are so deep that they are not able to agree on a book. Moreover, there 
has been no decision regarding religious education till today and no curricula were 
developed regardless of the efforts made (Frayha 2003; Frayha 2004). This emphasizes 
that sectarian elites are afraid of change and are manipulating education for personal 
interests rather than seeking national unity.  
A study conducted by Charbel Antoun shows that seventy-seven different 
religious books taught in private schools discriminate between religions, stress 
superiority over the other religion, and are based on indoctrination. Antoun highlights 
how the books differentiate between “Muslim and Christian,” “our faith and their faith,” 
and “us and them” (as cited in Frayha 2004, 190). In addition, religious education in 
Lebanon seeks to brainwash students’ minds where religion becomes the only source of 
knowledge and accepted morals (Nahas 2001). The numerous religious books taught in 
schools focus on each sect’s religious figures and traditions; how to pray, what is 
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considered a sin, how to go to heaven. For instance, the religion books from the series 
Al-Islam Risalatuna (Islam is our Message) are taught in Shiite schools. The book for 
grade five students questions the reader on page 182 whether he/she prefers to go to 
heaven or hell. It stresses that in order to go to heaven, one has to believe in God and 
abide by His laws or else he/she will go to hell (as cited in Younan 2000, 213). Another 
example is the series Tariq Al-Mahaba (The Path of Love) taught in Christian schools. 
The book taught for the first intermediate class questions the students about where they 
were born, when they were baptized, and the names of their church, priest, and 
godparents. This book activity then asks the students to list the names of their Christian 
friends to create a social religious group (as cited in Younan 2000, 250). From this 
perspective, religious education books stress sectarian identities and raise students to 
become sectarian. These books also use intimidation methods that increase students’ 
fear from going to hell if they do not follow their sect’s laws. To this end, students 
become sectarian and practice religion in order to escape from punishment.   
Instead of teaching students to accept people from other religions, Lebanese 
religious education hardens the disparities between religions (Nahas 2001). Sectarian 
education ensures one’s loyalty to the sect and teaches him/him to hate other sects and 
their symbols. This creates the image of the ‘other’ and forces people to differentiate 
between their sectarian group and others. It also creates inequality in the society and 
increases the feeling of fear from the sectarian ‘other’ (Younan 1999). Furthermore, 
religious education suppresses one’s freedom and obliges him/her to follow a certain 
religion and abide by its habits, rituals, heritage, holidays, food, laws, and living 
(Younan 1999). During religious education sessions in intersectarian schools, some 
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students leave the class because it contradicts their religion. This increases one’s feeling 
of being different from his/her classmates who remained in class. 
Not all is bad with religious education, however. Talal Atrissi examines four 
major religious book series taught in Shiite, Sunni, Maronite, and Orthodox schools for 
intermediate classes (2001). The series Al-Islam Risalatuna is taught in 447 Shiite 
public and private schools for about 105,000 students. The series Al-Tarbiya al-Islamiya 
(Islamic Education) is taught in 70 Sunni schools for about 22,000 students. The series 
Yasou‘ Tariqouna (Jesus is Our Path) is taught in 39 schools for about 33,418 students, 
and the series Lajnat Al-Ta‘aleem Al-Diny Al-Orthodoxy (The Committee of Orthodox 
Religious Teaching) is taught in Orthodox schools (Atrissi 2001). Atrissi concludes that 
while these religious books focus on one religion without explaining other religions, 
they also stress principles such as tolerance, virtue, and modesty, and do not encourage 
hatred between other religions (2001, 332). Thus, religious education should be situated 
in a matter that does not lead to social divisions and separate students in the same 
classroom (Frayha 2004). The following section highlights the debate pertaining to 
having a unified history book. 
 
3.5.2 – Teaching History 
Teaching Lebanese history strengthens national solidarity, citizenship, human 
rights, and the relationship between citizens and their country (Daher 2009). History 
education has triggered a debate over the years between different Lebanese factions. 
However, history books can pass on conflicts between different groups in the same 
country over the years. From this view, Lebanese schools still teach the 1971 history 
curriculum that is based on either Christian or Muslim affiliations (El-Amine 2009). 
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This old curriculum contains old information and methods, and should be changed.
29
 
Upon the recommendation of the Taif Agreement, the Lebanese government assigned 
the ECRD to unify history books. 
The ECRD appointed a special committee that included members from several 
sectarian groups and history specialists to write books that can be adopted by all schools 
(Frayha 2003; Frayha 2004). Due to the divergent perspectives of the first two assigned 
committee members regarding Lebanon’s identity and its relation with the Arab world, 
a third committee was appointed on 20 June 1997 (Frayha 2003; Frayha 2004). This 
committee included seven members who set the history curricula for all pre-university 
classes (Frayha 2003). On 10 May 2000, Cabinet approved the curricula with Decree 
No. 6/2000 after several consultations and examinations by the Council of Shawra and 
the Minister of Education (Frayha 2003; Bashshur 2003). On 22 June 2000, the new 
history curricula for grades two to six were published by Presidential Decree No. 3175 
(Frayha 2004). 
However, the Minister of Education Abdelrahim Murad objected to the title of 
lesson seventeen – “They Had All Gone and Lebanon Remained: Independence of a 
Country” – on page eighty-eight in the third-grade elementary book concerning the AD 
636 Arab conquest of the current Lebanon (Frayha 2003; Frayha 2004, 187; Bashshur 
2003). The title was interpreted as categorizing Arabs similar to other occupants of 
Lebanon, or that Lebanon does not belong to the Arab world (Frayha 2003; Frayha 
2004; Bashshur 2003). The president of the ECRD Nemer Frayha proposed canceling 
the chapter while another member suggested removing the controversial page from the 
book, but Murad refused these suggestions (Frayha 2003). Furthermore, Murad objected 
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to several facts that he considered “errors” in the book – such as the French nationality 
of Taha Hussein’s wife, the mandatory military enrollment of Kamel El-Sabbah in the 
Ottoman army that prevented him from continuing his education, and Gebran Khalil 
Gebran’s continuing his education in the United States (Frayha 2003). Frayha notes: 
The textbooks were written in a very professional and educative way. I do not 
actually see a reason to make a fuss about the history textbook. It was easy to 
deal with what was considered as a shortcoming or a problem. Historically and 
politically speaking, the “Arab conquest” is the correct term to be used. When 
you say “Arab conquest,” you mean the nationality not that they are foreigners.30 
 
Changing the term “Arab conquest” would not have affected third-grade 
students’ ideologies or views towards Arabs since they are unable to form political 
opinions at an early age (Wehbe 2003). In addition, Murad requested examining the 
history books for grades four, five, and six before publishing them to send his 
comments to the Consultative Committee within forty-eight hours (Frayha 2003). On 9 
October 2001, grade four and six books were submitted to the minister while grade five 
books were being inspected by the Consultative Committee (Frayha 2003). However, 
the books never left the minister’s office even after the end of his term. On 1 December 
2001, Murad requested schools to temporarily replace the history session with civic 
education (Frayha 2003; Frayha 2004; Daher 2009). Ten days later, Frayha was 
suspended from his position (Frayha 2003). Some suggested that Murad requested 
suspending Frayha along with the General Director of the Ministry of Education 
Mtanious El-Halabi because they refused to pass on projects for Murad since that would 
violate the law (An-Nahar 2001). Murad thus delayed transactions of the ECRD and 
removed several privileges from El-Halabi (An-Nahar 2001). Frayha asserts: 
It was beyond the minister’s prerogatives to suspend the books; the law does not 
give him the right to stop a textbook that was mentioned in the Taif Agreement. 
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The law indicates that the ECRD decides how the textbook should be written, 
printed, and published. I formed the committee and did not ask the minister and 
his advisors to be part of it. Thus, it was a personal revenge to stop a national 
project because they were not part of it. They disregarded professionalism and 
education and went after their ego to prove that they can do so.
31
 
 
The minister’s objection to the book was due to personal and political reasons 
rather than academic ones (Frayha 2003). Different regional and local actors affected 
the formation of the history book (Wehbe 2003). In this sense, sectarian elites 
manipulated the reform process to serve political privileges and sectarian interests. 
According to Frayha: 
When those politicians started to interfere and stop the history book, they were 
actually killing this attempt to create a common memory for the postwar 
generation. They were perpetuating the ideas, values, and negative attitudes of 
the war because they themselves were symbols of the war, participated in it, and 
committed crimes against Lebanon during the war.
32
 
 
A new committee of ten historians was later formed to write a new book. It 
finished its work in 2005 but did not publish anything (Daher 2009). Recently, former 
Minister of Education Hassan Mneimneh formed a committee to create a new book and 
it presented the new book in a conference in March, however,  
it is still a project. There is nothing new in the curriculum except that they added 
the post-independence period, the 1960s, 1970s, the civil war, the Taif 
Agreement, and the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic El-Hariri. But I do not 
think adding new material is the issue. It is good to add new material, but why 
would you put yourself in a situation where the assassination of El-Hariri is still 
a hot topic in our society? What should be changed is the methodology of 
teaching not the title of a chapter. It is a shameful curriculum!
33
 
 
Moreover, several religious groups rejected unifying history books in order to 
teach their own perspective of Lebanon and to maintain publishers’ economic privileges 
(Frayha 2003; Frayha 2004). After suspending the ECRD books, publishing companies 
competed in publishing numerous history books (Daher 2009). In 2008, schools adopted 
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more than twenty sectarian history books that lacked credibility, maintained students’ 
allegiance to sectarian zu‘ama, and served their image and role in Lebanese history 
(Daher 2009). A study conducted by LACR examines five different books for grade 
five; three were created in the pre-war period and two were created during the civil war. 
The study analyzes the content of these books regarding the image of Prince 
Fakhereddine, the East, the West, and the 1860 sectarian strife. The study concludes that 
each of these books show different perspectives and sectarian affiliations. For instance, 
one book highlights that the 1860 civil strife was a conflict among Christians and 
Druze, another one blames the Christians, while a third one stresses Ottoman and 
Western interests (Bilad 2007). In this sense, current history books exacerbate 
differences and divisions among Lebanese where each sect teaches its own version of 
history. Furthermore, history writing in Lebanon is based on including certain events 
while removing some important ones that happened in the country (Wehbe 2003). 
History books discuss past events without mentioning the present or learning from past 
experiences (Wehbe 2003). Schools currently teach history once per week for 
intermediate and secondary grades through student-centered lecturing methods (Daher 
2009). The following section will discuss the new civic education curricula. 
  
3.5.3 – Teaching Civics 
Although the Taif Agreement called for unified civic education books, the 
Lebanese government interfered in the making of the books under the pretext of 
national unity (Harik 1999). However, politicians manipulated this objective to serve 
their own interests (Harik 1999). A committee was assigned to create the new civic 
education books and curricula (Frayha 2004). The objectives of the new civic education 
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curricula stressed the concepts of a Lebanese and Arab identity, tolerance, equality, the 
state and its institutions, empowering citizens, civil society institutions, environmental 
awareness, and justice (Harb 2007). The Council of Shawra, which included six 
members with different sectarian identities and political affiliations, approved the 
curriculum and referred it to the ECRD Specialists Council and the Ministry of 
Education (Frayha 2004). In 1995, Cabinet approved the general objectives of the 
curricula, and the books were published in 1997 for all grades (Frayha 2004). Currently, 
civic education is taught in schools during one session per week for grades one to 
twelve (Frayha 2004). However, most Lebanese students are enrolled in private schools. 
Consequently, it is not clear whether all Lebanese students are studying in the new 
unified book due to the government’s inability to supervise public education (Khaledieh 
2009). 
Nor is the content of the new civic education books meets up to standards. While 
several institutions were informally consulted regarding the curricula, students’ 
opinions were not taken into consideration (Frayha 2004). The new civic education 
books also suffer from ambiguity since they are dependent upon the authors’ views and 
seek to inform rather than achieve certain objectives (El-Amine 2009). For instance, the 
civic education book for the third secondary class discusses media’s freedom and its 
role in creating a democratic society, the role of confederations, Lebanese Diaspora, 
environmental issues, and the electoral process (ECRD 2010b). However, the book does 
not relate these abstract concepts to real-life examples from Lebanon and does not 
highlight the flaws in the Lebanese system. The books are didactic but lack the applied 
approach.
34
 They encourage indoctrination and lack examples and activities that 
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empower students’ skills. Furthermore, the content of the books can be obtained from 
public life which makes it unnecessary to have a new curriculum or unified books (El-
Amine 2009). Moreover, the books do not mention the Lebanese political system 
(Frayha 2004). Surprisingly, the word ‘sectarianism’ is not mentioned in any lesson. As 
Younan notes: 
How can you create a civic education book that should unite Lebanese in a 
postwar country like Lebanon without mentioning ‘sectarianism’? This book 
should reunite Lebanese. Moreover, there are no specialized Lebanese teachers 
in civic education; they are either social sciences or Arabic teachers.
35
 
 
A study conducted by Adonis Acra shows that the new civic education curricula 
address “civil security” rather than “civil peace” (as cited in Frayha 2004, 192). It 
teaches theories that make students view civics as a subject studied only to pass exams, 
and do not include concepts such as democracy, meritocracy, sovereignty, and the 
independence of institutions (as cited in Frayha 2004, 192). Another study conducted by 
Aisha Zoreika stresses that the subject matter includes lectures more than introductive 
activities and participation; moreover, some activities are not related to the objectives, 
and most teachers are not social studies specialists (as cited in Frayha 2004, 192). The 
reformed civic education curriculum is not an effective one to create a sense of 
citizenship. Rather than tackling the Lebanese political system, the new books depend 
upon abstract theories that do not apply to the Lebanese case. This emphasizes that 
sectarian elites have escaped from discussing sensitive issues, such as political 
sectarianism and corrupt state institutions. 
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3.6 – The Case of the Lebanese University 
In addition to pre-university schools and the impact of their teaching on citizens, 
the public Lebanese University has played an important role in Lebanese sectarian 
culture. Education in the Lebanese University started on 20 October 1951, but the 
legislative Decree to establish it was issued on 6 February 1953 (Abu Rujeili 1999). 
Law 75/67 specifies the role of the Lebanese University as a national public institution 
offering higher education to all Lebanese groups (El-Amine et al. 1999). The law 
stresses the university’s administrative, educational, and financial independence from 
the government, but paradoxically retains Cabinet and parliamentary supervision over 
the university (El-Amine et al. 1999). 
Between the 1960s and 1970s, the Lebanese University had students from 
numerous sectarian and political backgrounds. This increased social integration between 
Muslims and Christians (El-Amine 2009). In April 1968, Lebanese University students 
and teachers started a fifty day strike demanding a unified university campus, an 
increase in teachers’ wages, more student scholarships, and the establishment of 
university restaurants (Traboulsi 2007). The university’s administration did not respond 
to these demands, but the leftist student union continued protesting nevertheless 
(Traboulsi 2007). In March 1972, the union organized a strike to increase pressure on 
the university, and student groups forced the closure of private universities – the 
American University of Beirut, the University of Saint Joseph, and the Beirut Arab 
University – to support Lebanese University students (Traboulsi 2007). Student strikes 
continued over the years. They demanded a national university that uses Arabic as its 
language of instruction, provides scientific subjects that were only available in private 
universities, and makes education accessible to everyone (Petran 1987). The Lebanese 
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University student union strived to achieve these reforms regardless of the 
government’s repression, and it became “the back-bone of the entire student movement” 
(Petran 1987; 141). The last student protest occurred only few days before the 
beginning of the 1975 civil war. During the war, its contribution to social movements 
decreased compared to the pre-war period (Traboulsi 2007; El-Amine 2009).  
The Lebanese University has witnessed the opening of new campuses where one 
could find at least one branch or faculty in every area. Prior to 1975, students demanded 
establishing university branches outside Beirut to achieve decentralization and increase 
educational opportunities (El-Amine et al. 1999). However, Decree No. 122 issued in 
1977, also “known as the Branching Decree”, allowed for the establishment of new 
branches of the Lebanese University in different districts and in Beirut (Bashshur 2003, 
171). Muslims opposed the university’s branching because it would create partition in 
Lebanon, whereas Christians supported it because it would maintain freedom of choice 
and independence (Bashshur 2003). But when more branches were created, even 
opponents of new campuses sought to establish branches in their own areas (El-Amine 
et al. 1999). The Lebanese University consequently lost its national identity and became 
the victim of powerful militias and sectarian parties (El-Amine et al. 1999). The 
university also lost its autonomy and became dependent upon personal interests where 
political leaders assigned the administrative and educational committees of the different 
branches (El-Amine et al. 1999).  
During the civil war, the level of social integration decreased between sectarian 
areas which entailed establishing new campuses. However, leaders manipulated the 
“Branching Decree” to gain privileges and harden confessional allegiances (Bashshur 
2003). By 1982-1983, the Lebanese University had thirty-one campuses and each sect 
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wanted to establish campuses in its areas (Bashshur 2003). When the war ended these 
new campuses were utilized to establish demographic, geographic, and political 
positions; the winner of the war sought more privileges and the loser strived to have 
more branches for sectarian interests rather than academic ones.
36
 In every district, even 
the small ones, there are branches for the Lebanese University belonging to different 
political parties that go beyond any rational need.
37
 Political powers competed to gain 
more powers in the Lebanese University by appointing the university’s president to 
influencing student activities (El-Amine et al. 1999). By 1997-1998, the number of 
branches increased to forty-three. Currently, there are forty-eight Lebanese University 
campuses in Lebanon. Numerous faculties suffer from the lack of financial assets and 
the deterioration of their academic standards (El-Amine et al. 1999). This stresses that 
politicians manipulate their ability to open new campuses to serve sectarian privileges 
without considering educational standards. 
In 1997, Muslim students made up a majority in the five largest Lebanese 
University campuses, except in Eastern Beirut where Christians dominated (Bashshur 
2003). Muslim Shiites were a majority in the South and Western Beirut branches, 
whereas Muslim Sunnis predominated the Bekaa and the North branches. Maronite 
Christians predominated the Eastern Beirut branch (Bashshur 2003). This emphasizes 
how social integration between Lebanese has decreased due to the establishment of 
numerous campuses. From this perspective, sectarian elites maintain the clientlist 
system and hinder social unity to sustain their power. For the academic year 2009-2010, 
72,813 students were enrolled in the different Lebanese University campuses; 65,381 of 
them were Lebanese and 7,432 non-Lebanese (ECRD 2010a). 25,449 students attended 
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the first Lebanese University branch, 13,264 attended the second branch, 13,819 
attended the northern branch, 6,892 attended the Bekaa branch, and 10,877 attended the 
southern branch (ECRD 2010a). These branches offer educational opportunities to all 
social segments due to the low tuition fees, approximately 300,000 Lebanese pounds 
per year. However, it is mostly restricted to the poor who are unable to cover the 
expenses of private universities and due to its weak educational standards. Although 
Taif stressed the reform of the Lebanese University, there has been no initiative. 
Sectarian elites seek to maintain the system in order to open more campuses and 
increase their sectarian and economic interests. 
 
3.7 – Conclusion: Education or Personal Interests? 
The aforementioned cases demonstrate how sectarian leaders hinder reforming 
the educational system. From this perspective, sectarian leaders use the educational 
system to preserve their power and interests. If the educational system changes, this 
may undermine the hold of sectarian identities and lose partly the power of sectarian 
elites. Some politicians offer neopatrimonial educational services and scholarships to 
different sectarian factions, or assign teachers and administrative committees, in 
different schools, to gain their support. In this way, they manipulate education to 
impose a clientelist system that serves their personal interests. This shows that the real 
players in the Lebanese political arena are sectarian elites rather than the state. Sects are 
able to control schools and harden sectarian identities. However, this creates deep 
disparities among the Lebanese people and leads to more conflicts and wars that can be 
easily ignited in a country that has already witnessed two civil wars. Not having a 
session for religious education in schools that teaches about different religions and a 
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common view regarding the history and facts of the country hardens sectarian identities 
and hinder social integration. Furthermore, the inability to produce civic education 
books that teach citizenship, or establish a national public Lebanese University creates 
the image of the sectarian ‘other’ and increases fear among sects. Thus, the educational 
system in Lebanon requires major reforms, if not changes, to limit the sectarian 
cleavages and create a unified national identity among students and citizens. The next 
chapter examines sectarian personal status laws and how sectarian elites have resisted 
civil marriage in Lebanon. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SECTARIAN WALL AGAINST CIVIL MARRIAGE 
 
“Each one prays to God according to his own light.” 
Mahatma Mohandas Gandhi 
 
4.1 – Introduction 
On 13 March 1936, the French High Commissioner Damien De Martel issued 
Decree No. 60 L.R. The Decree recognizes eighteen sects in Lebanon – twelve 
Christian, five Muslim, and one Jewish (Zayd El-Zein 2010a). Fifteen personal status 
laws administer the affairs of these eighteen recognized sects concerning marriage, 
family relations, child custody, inheritance, and divorce (Khattab 2010). The Lebanese 
state prohibits civil marriages in Lebanon, but accepts ones performed abroad. The 
latter follows foreign civil laws; i.e. laws that regulate a state’s political, social, and 
economic system without relying on religious laws (Baghdadi 1998). 
This chapter examines how Lebanese personal status laws construct sectarian 
identities, and how sectarian elites hinder national integration by hampering civil 
marriage. It begins with a discussion of the different decrees that have embedded 
sectarian laws in Lebanese society. The chapter tackles the proposed optional civil 
personal status law concerning civil marriage and the debate it triggered. It then shows 
how the current Lebanese personal status laws violate human rights. The chapter 
concludes by examining how political and religious elites strive to maintain their 
interests by preventing any change or reform. 
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4.2 – Sectarian Personal Status Laws 
Decree 60 L.R. was issued to administer sectarian personal status codes while 
emphasizing the right of people to follow civil laws. Article 10 of the Decree, amended 
on 18 November 1938, asserts that Lebanese and Syrians belonging to a recognized sect 
should abide by their sects’ laws, whereas those who do not belong to any sect or follow 
ordinary laws should abide by civil laws (Zayd El-Zein 2010a). Article 14 of the Decree 
declares the following: “The sects follow an ordinary law regulating their affairs and 
managing them freely within the limits of civil laws” (UNDP 2009, 76). Furthermore, 
Article 17 of the decree stresses that “personal status matters for Syrians and Lebanese 
belonging to one of the sects mentioned in Article 14 and following, or those not 
belonging to one of these sects, shall be subject to civil law” (UNDP 2007, 76). These 
articles stress the formation of a civil law that governs people who wish to follow them. 
On 18 November 1938, Decree No. 146 L.R. was issued to amend Decree No. 60 L.R. 
However, Muslims objected to the decrees and demonstrations took place in Beirut and 
Damascus in 1938 (Traboulsi 1998). Thus, on 30 March 1939, the French High 
Commissioner Gabriel Puaux issued Decree No. 53 L.R. excluding Muslims from 
Decree No. 60 L.R. and Decree No. 146 L.R. that administer personal status matters and 
allow people to abide by civil laws (Traboulsi 1998; Moukheiber 1998; Zayd El-Zein 
2010a).  
Muslim clergymen thus proscribed the emergence of a civil law that citizens can 
follow, and forced Muslims to abide by the sectarian personal status laws based on the 
Islamic Shari‘a. On 2 April 1951, a law was issued that indicates in its Article 16 that if 
Lebanese belonging to any Christian or Jewish sect receive a civil marriage in Lebanon 
it would be considered invalid (Moukheiber 1998). The same thing was later applied to 
 62 
 
Druze receiving a civil marriage in Lebanon (Al-Qazzi 2007). Thus, the only people 
who can follow civil laws are either those who do not belong to any sect or those who 
belong to a sect following civil laws (Moukheiber 1998).  
On 1 December 1924, Decree No. 2851 obliged all people living in Greater 
Lebanon to create personal status documents (Zayd El-Zein 2010b). However, on 7 
December 1951, the Lebanese state amended this decree and issued a law to regulate all 
personal status documents concerning birth certificates, marriage, divorce, death 
certificates, marriage annulment, and religious conversions (Traboulsi 1998). The 
French and later the Lebanese authorities imposed the personal status law system on the 
Lebanese which in turn hardened sectarian identities. These personal status documents 
hindered people’s freedom and obliged them to submit an application to the specialized 
authorities if they wished to convert to another sect (Traboulsi 1998). From this 
perspective, Lebanese citizens became members of sectarian groups.  
On 2 April 1956, a law was issued to establish sectarian courts. Article 33 of the 
law indicates that all sects should provide their bylaws to the Lebanese state to be 
recognized (Mesqawi 1997). Yet, some laws have not been presented even though they 
are adopted as legal customs (Mesqawi 1997). For example, in 1991, the Catholics 
adopted new laws according to the Vatican even though it is illegal to do so without 
passing this change through Parliament, whereas the Greek Orthodox Church published 
its laws in November 2009 (Zalzal 1997; Khattab 2010). Paradoxically, some sects were 
recognized before they published their bylaws. This shows that sectarian groups do not 
abide by the state’s regulations. From this view, every sect manages its own personal 
status matters without taking into consideration what is legal and constitutional. Sects 
also administer their laws without the interference of the Lebanese state which does not 
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impose penalties on violators. However, the Court of Cassation can interfere in the 
ruling of sectarian courts if there was incompetency or violation of civil order (UNDP 
2009). Rather than regulating and supervising the work of sectarian courts, the 
Lebanese government funds these courts from its budget. In 2010, the expenditure of 
the government’s general budget on sectarian courts reached approximately 14.7 billion 
Lebanese pounds (The Monthly 2011).  
Article 9 of the Lebanese Constitution underlines the state’s respect of all sects 
and their personal status matters. The Lebanese citizen thus abides by his/her sectarian 
laws and courts “from the cradle to the grave but does not participate in or benefit from 
effective state oversight over religious authorities” (UNDP 2009, 70). Not belonging to 
a sect in Lebanon is impossible with the absence of a civil personal status law. Any 
individual who leaves his/her sect has to convert to another sect and follow the new 
sect’s personal status laws. Furthermore, people belonging to a sect having no personal 
status laws – such as the Ismailis or Bahais – do not enjoy personal status rights. Thus, 
such sects have to convert to a recognized sect and follow its personal status system 
(UNDP 2009). From this perspective, the Lebanese personal status system denies some 
citizens their inalienable rights and forces them to be members of a recognized sect. 
Lebanese sectarian personal status laws prohibit performing civil marriages in 
Lebanon. However, the number of Lebanese who are having a civil marriage is 
constantly increasing due to personal beliefs or because some Christians want to escape 
from divorce or marriage annulment restrictions (Al-Qazzi 2007). Lebanese citizens 
wishing to receive a civil marriage can do so abroad according to foreign laws and they 
then settle their marriage matters in the Lebanese civil courts that recognize such 
marriages (UNDP 2009). Lebanese consulates abroad are informed about the performed 
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civil marriage and they send its contract to Lebanon to register it in the specialized 
personal status systems (Al-Qazzi 2007). But would it not be easier for the Lebanese 
government to issue civil laws for its own citizens? Lebanon has witnessed several 
attempts to implement civil personal status laws, however, they have all failed. The 
following section examines these attempts. 
 
4.3 – The Battle for an Optional Civil Personal Status Law 
So far the Lebanese state has hindered any attempt to formulate an optional civil 
personal status law for those who wish to do so. In 1971, the first such draft law was 
written by Abdullah Lahoud, Norma Melhem, and Joseph Moghaizel, and was adopted 
by the Democratic Party (Al-Sabie 1998; UNDP 2009). In 1972, August Bakhous, the 
co-founder of the Democratic Party, chaired Parliament’s Administration and Justice 
Committee and labeled this draft law on the committee’s agendas twice yearly. 
However, the draft law’s legislation discussion was adjourned due to the civil war (Al-
Sabie 1998; UNDP 2009). On 17 July 1997, the Syrian Socialist National Party also 
proposed a draft law to the Parliament’s Administration and Justice Committee 
(Beydoun 1999). Debate over the issue took place but most sects refused it. 
The latest attempt was done by former Lebanese President El-Hrawi. On 22 
November 1996, El-Hrawi declared his initiative to promulgate an optional civil 
personal status law, and repeated his suggestion on 25 November 1996 (Al-Sabie 1998; 
Beydoun 1999; El-Hrawi and Mnassa 2002). El-Hrawi assigned a committee of legal 
experts representing all Lebanese sects to formulate a civil personal status law (Dagher 
1998). The committee members considered all religious laws, but they disagreed on 
inheritance issues and the marriage of a Muslim woman to a Christian (Dagher 1998). 
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This was mainly because Islam forbids Muslim women from marrying a non-Muslim 
man and also prohibits non-Muslims to inherit from Muslims. On 16 February 1998, El-
Hrawi announced his draft law. He explained that the proposed law would help achieve 
democracy, respect human rights, provide equality between men and women, maintain 
the autonomy of legislation from religious beliefs, strengthen family and marriage 
bonds, and manage divorce on reasonable basis (Bakhous 1998). El-Hrawi’s law asserts 
that people wishing to receive a civil marriage should abide by the civil laws of the civil 
courts (Zayd El-Zein 2010a). In addition to tackling marriage issues, the law discusses 
adoption, inheritance, child custody, divorce, family matters, raising kids, and forbids 
having multiple wives (Zayd El-Zein 2010a).   
Two divergent opinions emerged regarding the proposed law: some people 
supported the law while others opposed it. The mufti of the Republic Mohammad 
Rachid Qabbani refused the proposed law under the pretext that it contradicts Islamic 
principles (Beydoun 1999). Different sectarian elites also opposed the proposed law 
suggesting that the political situation does not make it the right time to discuss 
abolishing political sectarianism (Beydoun 1999). Others argued that people wishing to 
receive a civil marriage can do so abroad and that it is not the prerogative of the state to 
manage personal status laws (Beydoun 1999). Furthermore, Muslim and Christian 
clergymen argued that this law disregards all religious principles regarding marriage. 
Muslims stressed that the law is illegal pertaining to issues of inheritance, adoption, the 
marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim, and polygamy (Beydoun 1999). 
Even regional actors intervened and presented their opinions on the issue. The 
Saudi mufti Abdelaziz bin Bazz along with five other Muslim scholars declared that the 
proposed law is against Islamic laws and all religions (Beydoun 1999). While Iran and 
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the Vatican remained silent on the issue, their local allies presented their perspectives. 
Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah refused the proposed law, and the 
Lebanese Catholic churches that follow the Vatican also refused it (Beydoun 1999).  
Advocates of the proposed law argued that the law respects human rights, 
women’s rights, one’s freedom in choosing their partner, and that the Lebanese 
Constitution stresses human rights and freedom of belief (Beydoun 1999). Furthermore, 
implementing an optional civil personal status law does not mean adopting blasphemy 
or annulling religious laws, but rather strengthening national integration (Al-Sabie 
1998). Christian advocates argued that the Vatican accepted both civil and religious 
marriages and left the choice for people, whereas Muslim advocates argued that 
Lebanon is not an Islamic state and there are several laws in Lebanon that contradict 
Islam and its Shari‘a – such as alcohol trade, legalizing gambling, and the penal code 
(Melhem 1998; Beydoun 1999). On the other hand, there are many advocates of the 
law. They consist of intellectuals and civil society activists. However, they are 
incapable of making a change to the law due to their lack of political and religious 
influence (Beydoun 1999).  
On 18 March 1998, El-Hrawi submitted his proposed optional personal status 
law to Cabinet (Al-Sabie 1998; Beydoun 1999). A strong majority of the Cabinet 
endorsed the proposed law; twenty-one ministers voted for the law while six others, 
represented by former Prime Minister El-Hariri and his ministerial bloc, voted against 
it. Suleiman Franjieh refrained from voting, and Walid Junblatt – who declared his 
support for the law – and Hagop Demrejian did not attend the session (Beydoun 1999). 
Sources suggest that El-Hariri refused to sign the draft law because it would weaken 
Sunni power (Reinkowski and Saadeh 2006). This draft law would give priority to civil 
 67 
 
courts to manage citizens’ personal status matters rather than referring to sectarian 
courts and empowering the confessional system. In this sense, El-Hariri violated the 
Lebanese Constitution which stipulates that a bill having a two-thirds majority votes in 
Cabinet becomes a law. Thus, the draft law never reached Parliament for final approval 
but was rather shelved (Beydoun 1999; UNDP 2009). From this perspective, statesmen 
hampered any attempt to implement it because they feared losing their interests and 
power. It was a battle between sectarian elites. In their pursuit to gain more privileges 
and power, sectarian elites followed “the interest of their sects, bringing the country to 
the brink of fragmentation” (Reinkowski and Saadeh 2006, 107). Muslim citizens who 
supported El-Hariri opposed the law, while Maronites who supported El-Hrawi 
supported the law. The other major sects in the country based their opinion regarding 
the proposed law on their political-sectarian affiliations. 
Lebanon has not yet formulated a civil personal status law so it would not affect 
the sectarian balance in the country or decrease the power and privileges of religious 
men. In this sense, religious men forbid civil laws in Lebanon so that people do not 
have other options than being imprisoned in sectarian laws. This hinders Lebanese 
citizens from receiving a civil marriage in their own country and forces them to travel, 
receive a civil marriage abroad, and follow foreign laws. Sectarian and political elites 
also seek to maintain the current balance and cohesion of sects. Any attempt to change 
the system might be seen as an attempt to overthrow existing powers and change the 
sectarian edifice. Some political parties that used to be progressive are now afraid that 
extremist groups might rule the country. As Marie Rose Zalzal, a Lebanese lawyer and 
human rights activist, contends:  
Individuals benefiting from the sectarian political system might believe that a 
new sect – a nineteenth sect – is emerging in the country which might compete 
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with them and steal their interests. The nineteenth sect might ask for Grade One 
employees, parliamentary seats, ministers, or a prime minister. Thus, sectarian 
elites close the door for such debates.
38
 
 
In this sense, sectarian leaders maintain their authority and satisfy their political 
interests without having any competitors. The Lebanese consociational system is based 
on power-sharing where major sects divide power among them. Thus, any attempt to 
change the current political system would mean a change of power balance where one 
sect might obtain more shares than the others.  
Sectarian elites, both political and religious, also fear they will not be able to 
control people if civil laws were available. The draft law would limit the influence of 
sectarian elites on their constituencies, and hinder their ability to control the latter 
through sectarian laws. Furthermore, sectarian religious authorities prohibit civil 
marriage to preserve their own interests. Sectarian courts and judges who receive bribes 
to settle certain matters are the main opponents of civil marriage.
39
 El-Hrwai contends 
that the law was resisted by religious leaders because if civil courts were followed, the 
state would stop financing sectarian courts and thus the payroll of sectarian judges 
would be terminated (El-Hrawi and Mnassa 2002). Thus, sectarian elites block any 
attempt to discuss civil laws and base their arguments on religious values and political 
circumstances. In this case, people feel that they have no choice but to abide by existing 
sectarian laws. Religious men utilize coercion as a means to force people to act as the 
former wishes and comply with their laws. They persuade citizens that if they follow 
sectarian laws they will be rewarded in the afterlife and avoid God’s punishment. As 
Beydoun notes: 
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Sectarian elites emphasize that civil marriage violates religion and God. They 
use religion as the sacred weapon to intimidate people and reject civil 
marriage.
40
 
 
Thus, religious people directly foreclose the option of receiving a civil marriage for fear 
of going to hell. However, religion’s purpose is not to intimidate people and oblige 
them to follow its laws. Marriage should not depend upon intimidating religious reasons 
as much as it should rely on personal convictions. Nor are legal principles static. They 
are rather a function of existing cultural and political circumstances.  
During the early centuries, Christian marriages were held at state courts prior to 
churches that forbid intermarriages in the fifth century (Kefrouni 1997). Wael Hallaq 
(2007) reminds us that in the age of the pre-modern state Shari‘a was not only a legal or 
judicial doctrine, but it was also entrenched in social relations, economics, ethics, 
morality, intellectuality, in addition to various cultural norms. This made social morality 
inseparable from fiqh and its legal reasons. It was a way of living. However, the advent 
of modern Western institutions and laws replaced Shari‘a and became alternatives of 
fiqh. The modern state implemented laws in order to discipline citizens and created 
legal institutions that were above the social order (Hallaq 2007). In the process, Shari‘a 
itself was transformed (Hallaq 2007).  
Modern Islamic laws should be based on Shari‘a but adaptive to contemporary 
circumstances. Every citizen is supposed to follow certain religious institutions and 
settle his/her matters according to sectarian laws. A Muslim person cannot get married 
without the presence of a sheikh. Religious jurists specialized in different issues – such 
as divorce – use mediation/arbitration methods in conflict resolution. These traditions 
are similar to the traditional law. However, time has changed, and thus there is a need 
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for new laws. From this perspective, adopting modern and civil laws does not contradict 
religion but rather develop its methods to serve people’s needs.  
Hallaq unpacks two types of reform to the Shari‘a: religious utilitarianism and 
religious liberalism, each relying on its own methods of ijtihad or jurisprudence (1997). 
Religious utilitarianists base their legal theory on public interest and depend upon a 
number of early principles of Islamic jurists. Muhammad ‘Abduh was the first religious 
utilitarianist who created a theology for restructuring legal ideas and argued for 
harmony between revelation and sound reason. On the other hand, religious liberalists 
differentiate between godly religious ideas and man-made religious explanations. They 
also rely on the historical framework of Qur’anic verses and revelations in their pursuit 
to comprehend revelation as text and context at the same time (Hallaq 1997). The 
religious liberals can be seen as similar to Al-Ghazali, in the sense that they do not take 
religion as it is but try to analyze it. Al-Ghazali did not accept the traditional religion or 
abide by the Qur’an as it is but rather went on a journey to truly find the meaning of 
religion. Sheikh Abdullah Al-Alayli uses Qur’anic verses in his jurisprudence to 
conclude that the marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man does not 
contradict Shari‘a laws but is rather based on old tribal values that forbid exogamy 
(intermarriage) and favor endogamy (intramarriage) (1992). One should realize that the 
Islamic system cannot prevail for different centuries where the social and cultural 
context of the society has changed. Therefore, Islamic law should be modified 
according to the era and life people are living in. In the case of liberalists, Shari‘a can 
be analyzed within the current social and cultural context. Thus, religious men, 
particularly Muslims, opposing civil marriage should comprehend that accepting civil 
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marriage does not contradict religious laws but rather complement them to make 
people’s lives easier in the modern world. 
Furthermore, a survey shows that since 1987 the acceptance of intermarriage has 
slightly decreased among adults while increasing among young citizens (UNDP 2009). 
The survey indicates that the level of condoning intermarriages changed from one 
governorate to another where male students in Beirut recorded the highest level. This 
acceptance is due to an increase in tolerating difference, participating in extracurricular 
activities and decision-making processes, accepting gender equality, and 
comprehending citizenship notions (UNDP 2009). A survey conducted by As-Safir 
newspaper and the Center for Development Studies and Projects shows that two-thirds 
of the Lebanese refuse the idea of civil marriage, while teenagers between the age of 
fifteen and twenty-four mostly accepted the idea of civil marriage in addition to 
widows, single, and divorced people (Ma‘loumat 1998). The study asserts that 
accepting the idea of civil marriage increases with the increase of education. 28.5% of 
the Lebanese people accept it and they are divided among: 61.6% of the Orthodox, 
55.5% of the Maronites, 44.2% of the Catholics, 41.4% of the Druze, 16.6% of the 
Shiites, 10.2% of the Sunnis, and 45.8% of other sects (Ma‘loumat 1998). This 
highlights that the idea of civil marriage and number of people wishing to follow civil 
laws is increasing over the years. Moreover, for some people to accept it means that 
they believe in its principles. Thus, there is a need to implement an optional personal 
status law. Yet, some sects refuse intermarriages due to social and historical fanaticism 
– such as the low level of intermarriage between different Muslim sects (Kefrouni 
1997). From this perspective, the optional civil personal status law can increase social 
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integration and national unity. The following section highlights the law’s positive 
aspects and recommends some amendments. 
  
4.4 – Civil Marriage: Sufficient or Flawed? 
The proposed law is optional rather than obligatory which means it respects the 
Lebanese Constitution and freedom of belief. Receiving a civil marriage does not 
prevent an individual from receiving a religious marriage. Non-recognized sects are 
forced to convert to a recognized sect or perform a civil marriage abroad because there 
is no Lebanese civil law, however, individuals who are unable to financially afford their 
travel expenses cannot get married (Zalzal 1997). Some people also evade sectarian 
laws by traveling to a foreign country to receive a civil marriage. In this sense, 
Lebanese sectarian personal status laws are making citizen’s lives harder and forbidding 
them from getting married in their own country.  
Furthermore, some Sunni daughters are forbidden to inherit from their fathers, 
thus forcing them to convert to another sect (Zalzal 1997). Implementing an optional 
civil marriage asserts that people marrying from other religions do not convert to 
another religion out of obligation but rather out of belief (Khodor 1998a). Moreover, 
Muslims reject the idea of a Muslim woman marrying a Christian man because he might 
force her to follow his religion. However, this is not the case nowadays where there is 
mutual respect between the couple and freedom of belief (Khodor 1998a). El-Hrawi’s 
law would produce national integration, maintain equality among citizens, and empower 
state’s sovereignty and ability to manage personal status laws (El-Halabi 1998). By 
implementing El-Hrawi’s law, people would not fear marrying from other sects or 
religions. Thus, social integration among citizens would increase and they would be 
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discriminated against according to their sectarian affiliations. The draft law would also 
ensure that Lebanese follow their country’s laws not foreign ones. This would ensure 
that the Lebanese state is autonomous from foreign laws and can provide its citizens’ 
demands. Furthermore, the draft law is a prerequisite to abolishing political 
sectarianism, as stipulated by Article 95 of the Constitution (El-Halabi 1998). 
Article 110 of the proposed law allows sectarian courts to deal with inheritance 
matters, and asserts that couples from different religions can inherit from one another 
(Zayd El-Zein 2010a). This means that in civil intermarriages, the living person inherits 
from the deceased partner according to the latter’s sectarian laws, whereas in 
intramarriages the living person inherits according to his/her sect’s laws. Non-Muslim 
sects follow the inheritance civil law of 23 June 1959 that ensures equality between men 
and women, while Muslims follow Shari‘a laws and jurisprudence (Mokarzel Hshaimeh 
2011). However, this article has some implications and cannot be applied. Law 1959 
does not depend upon religion in inheritance matters, however, Article 9 of this law sets 
a condition that the religion of the person inheriting does not forbid non-Muslims from 
inheritance as well (Najem 2011). On the other hand, Islamic laws forbid non-Muslims 
from inheriting from a Muslim. Hence, Muslims cannot inherit from non-Muslims and 
vice-versa (Najem 2011). Shari‘a laws also do not allow Druze to inherit from Muslims 
because they are not recognized as a sect of Islam. Thus, the only solution to guarantee 
inheritance would be that one of the couple converts to the other’s sect when both are 
still alive. However, things become complicated if one of the partners is a Druze. If a 
Druze person converts to another sect, he/she can never rejoin the sect. It is also 
impossible that a non-Druze converts to the Druze sect since no one can join the sect 
unless he/she is born a Druze. Inheritance problems can also arise for children whose 
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parents have different religions and received a civil marriage abroad (UNDP 2009). 
Thus, Article 110 of El-Hrawi’s law might be contradictory to the principle of having a 
civil law that is independent from religious laws. From this view, this Article needs to 
be amended to suit civil laws and the interests of the people who receive a civil 
marriage. The whole point behind receiving a civil marriage is to be liberated from all 
sectarian prisons and binding laws. A proposed civil personal status law should be 
wholly based on civil laws without depending on religious laws in any point 
whatsoever.  
Nevertheless, debate persists about which laws to follow in cases where a couple 
simultaneously receives a civil marriage and a religious one (Al-Qazzi 2007).  Some 
courts follow the laws of the marriage that was performed first, others follow religious 
laws, while others follow the laws of the registered marriage (Al-Qazzi 2007). Article 
79 of the Code of Civil Procedures indicates that civil courts are specialized in settling 
disputes occurring in a marriage performed abroad between two Lebanese or a foreigner 
and a Lebanese, depending upon the civil laws of the foreign country. However, the 
Article continues as follows: “The provisions of laws connected to the competency of 
Shari‘a and Druze courts shall be respected, if both parties to the marriage are Muslims 
and at least one is Lebanese” (UNDP 2009, 76). Thus, if two Muslims received a civil 
marriage abroad and want to get a divorce, they have to abide by their Shari‘a laws. In 
this sense, the couple has not escaped the sectarian laws and cannot follow civil laws. 
As Zalzal argues: 
This is a trap that most Muslims fall into. They assume that if they receive a civil 
marriage then they have liberated themselves from Shari‘a laws when disputes 
arise.
41
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In other divorce cases, Lebanese civil courts follow the foreign civil laws of the 
country where the marriage took place due to the absence of a Lebanese civil law 
administering divorce (Al-Qazzi 2007). In 2010, Judge John Al-Qazzi issued a 
preliminary decision that civil courts are responsible for any disputes arising from civil 
marriages even if they are followed by a Christian marriage (Sarkis 2010). Hence, 
numerous foreign laws are being implemented in Lebanon rather than creating specific 
civil laws for the Lebanese. For example, on 24 March 2005, the Third Court of First 
Instance in Mount Lebanon applied the English law to divorce a Christian Lebanese 
married to an English woman, since the marriage was performed in London (Al-Qazzi 
2007).  
Different problems also arise regarding adoption in marriages performed abroad, 
especially that Islam prohibits adoption. It is also necessary in such cases to have judges 
who are knowledgeable in foreign civil laws and ensure he/she is implementing them in 
the correct manner, which might be hard to find in some cases. Thus, an optional civil 
personal status law would be the best way to ensure the needs of all Lebanese citizens 
and implement Lebanese laws rather than foreign ones. The proposed civil law has its 
shortcomings and many amendments have been made to it. There have been nine civil 
personal status draft laws since August Bakhous’s draft.42 According to Zalzal: 
The importance of a civil law is that it satisfies people’s demands. Thus, a civil 
law can be changed unlike religious laws that are God-made and have no 
possibility for change. This is what religious men say but in reality they can be 
changed according to jurisprudence. Many countries have established their civil 
laws while depending upon religious jurisprudence.
43
 
 
The current personal status laws also violate inalienable human rights, the topic of the 
following section. 
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4.5 – The Violation of Universal Human Rights 
The preamble of the Lebanese Constitution confirms Lebanon’s respect of 
international covenants and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 16 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that men and women have the right 
to marry and share equal rights during marriage and in case of its annulment (Melhem 
1998). Article 9 of the Constitution also asserts freedom of belief. However, when a 
child is born he/she directly becomes part of his/her father’s sect and has to follow its 
personal status codes. In this sense, citizens can only enjoy their rights when they are 
part of a religious sect which restricts freedom of belief. Beydoun asserts that “the 
Lebanese Constitution indicates that freedom of belief is absolute, but where is this 
freedom?”44  
The Lebanese Constitution uses powerful terms that respect human rights, but 
these rights do not exist in reality. Nevertheless, Article 7 of the Constitution asserts 
equality among the Lebanese citizens in maintaining their civil and political rights. But 
how are citizens allowed to enjoy their civil rights in the absence of civil personal status 
laws?  
On 14 May 1991, Lebanon ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Article 14 of this Convention states the right of the child to freedom of religion, 
thought, and conscience. Thus, obliging the child to follow his/her father’s sect violates 
this Convention (UNDP 2009). Furthermore, on 3 November 1972, Lebanon ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 18 of the Covenant 
indicates that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
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choice” (UNDP 2009, 70). Consequently, obliging people to belong to any recognized 
sect and denying them their inalienable civil right of having a civil marriage contradicts 
the essence of human rights and international conventions. Lebanese personal status 
laws limit citizen’s ability to choose their own religion without directly belonging to a 
sect when he/she is born. In addition, atheists or agnostics cannot free themselves from 
their religion and leave their sect because they would lose personal status rights. 
Moreover, on 16 April 1997, Lebanon ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women. However, some laws are unjust to women 
because they prevent women from inheritance, prevent them from child custody in case 
of divorce, forbid them from requesting divorce, and force them to accept their 
husbands having multi-wives. In some sects, the chief of the sect can allow marriage 
after the age of seven, which is unacceptable and violates human rights.
45
 Yet, the 
standards of the United Nations have decreased and it is allowing such violations to 
occur and accepting that states put reservations on core Articles of the covenants.
46
 
Furthermore, sectarian courts enjoy great autonomy in their ruling and Islamic 
courts depend upon jurisprudence where different judges can interpret similar cases 
differently. Litigants also cover judges’ expenses that vary between sects concerning a 
similar court case. This violates the right to a just trial and equality of rights between 
litigants (UNDP 2009). In addition, not establishing a civil personal status law 
contradicts Decree No. 60 L.R. that asserts some people’s right to follow civil laws 
(Moukheiber 1998). From this perspective, Lebanese sectarian personal status laws 
violate a large number of inherent human rights, deny social unity, and hinder national 
integration. Therefore, implementing civil laws – but optional civil marriages – is 
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essential to provide citizens with their basic human rights and respect their well-being 
and freedom of belief. 
A civil state takes the side of citizens and is neutral vis-à-vis numerous religions 
and sects, which is mentioned in Article 9 of the Lebanese Constitution (UNDP 2009). 
Adopting an optional civil personal status law would respect people’s freedom of choice 
and belief. Thus, civil laws can be used as a human rights instrument that protects 
individuals’ rights and dignity. The optional law for civil marriage thus respects one’s 
absolute human rights and freedom of belief. However, sectarian elites manipulate the 
system and hinder reforms to serve their own political interests. 
 
4.6 – Conclusion: God’s Will or Sectarian Privileges? 
Refusing an optional civil personal status law begs the question: Was Rafic El-
Hariri against the proposed law because it contradicted his Muslim Sunni beliefs, even 
though he was a liberal Muslim, or was it merely to satisfy Saudi Arabia’s interests and 
sectarian privileges? Did Saudi Arabia, Iran, or the Vatican have the right to interfere in 
this Lebanese matter or was it only to preserve the Lebanese political system which 
benefits them? Do Lebanese have any other options than relying on sectarian laws? 
The Lebanese case shows that religious men are afraid of changing the system 
because they want to preserve their personal and institutional privileges. They 
consequently block any demands for reform. Some politicians know that secularism 
would solve Lebanon’s problems, however, they prefer not to change the system to 
preserve their sects’ social and financial power.  
On 25 October 1917, the Ottoman legislator issued a family law that was 
considered a civil law because it did not depend upon the Sunni or Hanafi laws. This 
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Ottoman family law followed civil courts and was applied on Muslims, Christians, and 
Jewish. It is still applicable in Lebanon and some courts recognize it if people wish to 
follow it. However, after sects created their own personal status laws, this law became 
applied only for Sunnis and can also be applied on Shiites without contradicting the 
sect’s regulations issued on 16 July 1962. Moreover, Article 58 of the Ottoman law 
indicates that the marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim is invalid (Al-Saleh 
1998). This means that there are currently no civil laws in Lebanon that can be 
implemented on people wishing to follow them. Thus, the only option nowadays for 
people who wish to have a civil marriage is to do so abroad and follow the civil laws of 
foreign states. 
Different reforms can take place and several amendments can be undertaken 
since religion’s role is not to complicate people’s life. What is truly needed in Lebanon 
is the political will to change. Civil laws should supervise personal status matters rather 
than being the exception to sectarian rules.
47
 Only a strong state can support such laws; 
if the state does not support civil marriage then sects will hinder its performance in 
Lebanon.
48
 Numerous personal status laws have been amended in Islamic and Arab 
countries due to ijtihad or popular demands for change. For instance, Egypt suspended 
religious courts and replaced them by civil courts that implement religious laws 
according to the litigant’s religion. Moreover, some Islamic countries have forbidden 
divorce in an oral manner and restricted it to the judiciary, while others have forbidden 
polygamy (Khodor 1998b). Yet, Lebanon has failed to legislate a national optional civil 
law even though it required and has been demanded. Nonetheless, one can argue that 
the high level of debate and competition between different Islamic schools tends to 
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increase the ambiguity of Shari‘a and reduce the courts’ reliance on it. Since the early 
ages, Ash‘arites and Mu‘tazilites schools of thought used to fight and describe each 
other as blasphemous. Instead of being occupied with religious teachings, they were 
more involved in attacking one another. Thus, rather than attacking civil personal status 
laws, sectarian elites should find a way to incorporate it into the system and adopt it.  
Lebanese citizens who refuse to belong to a sect, or those who belong to an 
unrecognized sect, have to wait and hope that the Lebanese sectarian elites and 
politicians will someday provide them with their human right to follow civil laws. 
However, Zalzal stresses that “the more sectarian people and fanatics are present, the 
lesser is the possibility of accepting civil marriage.”49 
Therefore, advocates of an optional civil personal status law should disseminate 
their ideas and lobby more for their demands to end this sectarian dilemma. The final 
chapter suggests secularism as a solution to this Lebanese predicament, and gives some 
recommendations to achieve it.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
 
“Ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country.” 
John F. Kennedy 
 
6.1 – General Findings and Conclusions 
This thesis examined how the Lebanese confessional system is sustained. From 
the Ottoman Empire to the French mandate, different measures and circumstances 
entrenched sectarian identities in Lebanon’s political system and culture. After 
Lebanon’s independence in 1926, sectarianism was entrenched in its Constitution. Over 
the years, the confessional political system has been dependent upon the representation 
of the major sects in Lebanon. This has created a clientelist system which hinders 
citizens’ democratic participation and increases corruption in the country. 
The thesis highlighted how two Lebanese institutions – the educational system 
and personal status laws – construct a sectarian culture and embed sectarian identities in 
postwar Lebanon. The Lebanese state allows sects to open their own private schools. 
Most students attend these schools where they are socialized into a sectarian culture 
from an early age and obtain a sectarian education. Sectarianism is also entrenched in 
teachers’ instruction methods which reflects their political affiliations, and in the 
content of books taught in schools.  
Moreover, in the twentieth century, the French issued numerous decrees to 
recognize religious sects and allow them to manage their own personal status laws. 
These sectarian laws force citizens to belong to a certain sect and abide by its 
regulations that limit freedom of belief and choice. From this perspective, the 
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educational system and personal status laws have been the main pillars of the Lebanese 
sectarian system throughout history and have played an important role in sustaining 
sectarian allegiances. 
This thesis also highlighted how sectarian elites control these institutions to 
serve their own interests and maintain privileges. After the Taif Agreement of 1989, 
numerous committees were assigned to create new school curricula, particularly history 
and civic education books, and reform public education and the Lebanese University. In 
academic year 1998-1999, the new curricula for all subjects were taught in schools. 
However, sectarian elites delayed the publication of history books due to an argument 
over a lesson concerning the Arab conquest in AD 636. No history book has been 
published since then. In 1999, religious education was reinstated in the curricula due to 
sectarian elites’ demands. This allows sectarian schools to disseminate their own 
religious principles and create the image of a sectarian ‘other’. New civic education 
books neither strengthen the sense of citizenship among students nor do they explain the 
Lebanese political system and the country’s history. In addition, the Lebanese 
University and the public educational sector have not yet undergone any reforms. 
Rather than establishing the Lebanese University to unite students from different sects 
and areas, sectarian elites have opened numerous campuses to serve their own clientelist 
networks. 
Lebanese sectarian personal status laws limit the formation of intersectarian 
identities, violate their inalienable human rights, and hamper citizens’ democratic 
participation. The Lebanese state also forbids citizens from receiving a civil marriage in 
Lebanon. People wishing to marry according to civil laws are obliged to do so abroad 
and follow foreign laws. Thus, several attempts have been made to implement an 
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optional civil personal status law. Former Lebanese President El-Hrawi’s draft law 
triggered debate among advocates and opponents of the law. El-Hrawi’s optional civil 
personal status law allows citizens to receive a civil marriage in Lebanon and abide by 
civil laws. The majority of the Cabinet voted for El-Hrawi’s draft law, however, former 
Prime Minister El-Hariri did not sign the law, because it was rejected by about all 
religious institutions. The law was never submitted to Parliament. From this 
perspective, sectarian elites hindered the adoption of a civil marriage bill to preserve 
their sectarian positions.  
This thesis thus argued that sectarian elites manipulate Lebanese institutions and 
hinder reform attempts to embed sectarian loyalties and serve their interests. In this 
way, sectarian elites sustain the clientelist confessional system and hinder the creation 
of a national Lebanese identity. This raises the question: What is the best means to 
achieve a democratic Lebanon where citizens are loyal to their country rather than 
sectarian patrons? 
 
6.2 – Choosing Confessionalism or Secularism? 
The Lebanese confessional system and sectarian institutions have failed to create 
a unified country and produced a fifteen-year civil war. Thus, it is necessary to think of 
a new system based on secular principles. A secular system would create a democratic 
system that serves the country’s interests rather than those of sectarian elites. A 
democratic secular society would hinder individuals’ manipulation of one another 
(Daher 1981). Implementing objective secularization would prevent religion’s 
interference in state institutions while subjective secularization would allow people to 
view their society according to secular doctrines (Keyman 2007). 
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Nevertheless, secularism can be divided into two categories: partial secularism 
and comprehensive secularism. Partial secularism is removing religion from political 
life. It does not tackle absolute moral values or people’s private lives (Elmessiri 2000). 
On the other hand, comprehensive secularism goes further than partial secularism from 
merely separating religion from the state to supervising one’s private and public life, 
eradicating religious values, and marginalizing God (Elmessiri 2000). 
For instance, after depending upon Islamic law for six centuries and under the 
rule of Mustafa Kamel Ataturk, Turkey institutionalized secularism and adopted 
Switzerland’s secular civil system (Çinar 2005). The secular state separated religion 
from politics, controlled all religious activities, abolished religious courts, and 
secularized education (Çinar 2005). Furthermore, Ataturk banned wearing religious 
clothes, holding religious titles, and attending Sufi dervish lodges (Navaro-Yashin 
2002). People who do not abide by these new laws were punished by state decree 
(Navaro-Yashin 2002). Yet, in the late twentieth century, Turkey witnessed a contested 
relationship with the emerging Islamists and political Islam (Çinar 2005). France has 
also adopted secularism and imposes secularism on its citizens (Esposito 2000). It relied 
on anti-religious belief and discriminates against women who wear the veil (Esposito 
2000). These two countries are examples of countries that have adopted comprehensive 
secularism. However, one can argue that such secularism contradicts with democracy 
and violates freedom of belief where everyone is entitled to act as he/she believes and 
wishes. Comprehensive secularism implements extreme secular measures and can be 
detrimental to multicultural societies. 
A multicultural country like Lebanon should instead adopt – what I call – a 
‘partial subjective and objective secularism’. Subjective secularism would decrease 
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opposed sectarian identities, while objective secularism would limit the Lebanese 
clientelist system; and partial secularism would respect different sectarian beliefs. This 
secularism involves removing religion from the state, assigning civil judges in the 
judiciary, unifying legislation and applying it equally to all citizens, and, finally, 
emphasizing the state’s support for public education (Traboulsi 2002). In this sense, 
Lebanese citizens would become equal regardless of their sectarian affiliations, and 
secularism would “protect the rights of believers and unbelievers” (Esposito 2000, 12). 
Secularism would also empower democratic institutions, guarantee freedom of opinion 
and belief, and strengthen the rule of law (Traboulsi 2002).  
Adopting partial secularism does not mean abolishing or contradicting religion 
and converting to blasphemy, however. It does not prevent personal beliefs; it merely 
displaces religion from political and social life (Taylor 2004). Religious and moral 
values can be present in a partially secular society on the condition that they do not 
intervene in politics (Elmessiri 2000). Secularism would remove religion from politics 
without eradicating it from people’s own lives and identities. Secularism would not 
abolish citizens’ personal religion but it is rather “an additional, not a replacement 
identity” (Harik 2003, 14). In addition, secularism is optional and voluntary where it 
allows citizens to make their own choices about what kind of education and marriage 
they wish to receive (Traboulsi 2002). 
The potential to implement secularization increases as citizens’ divergent views 
increase (Harik 2003). A survey conducted by Muhammad Faour and El-Amine shows 
that there was support for secularization during the Lebanese civil war and in the post-
war period (as cited in Harik 2003). This shows that in a country like Lebanon that has 
witnessed sectarian strives, people tend to accept secularism more. If secularism is 
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adopted, it seems much more likely that citizens would choose their country over their 
sect and ensure that the civil war would not be repeated. Lebanese would be free and 
break the sectarian prison they are obliged to be part of. Politics would not be based on 
confessional representation anymore, and thus everyone can be represented in a 
democratic manner. However, this begs the question: Are the Lebanese people prepared 
to adopt partial subjective and objective secularism? 
 
6.3 – Abolishing Political Sectarianism 
Most Lebanese politicians refuse to adopt secularism because it would 
undermine their privileges. However, some politicians argue that the best option for 
Lebanon is to abolish political sectarianism. Based on the Taif Agreement, point H of 
the Lebanese Constitution’s preamble and Article 95 assert that political sectarianism is 
a transitional phase to be abolished based on a gradual plan (Ziadeh 2006). Article 95 
stresses that a National Committee should be created after the first postwar 
parliamentary elections. This Committee should consist of the President of the 
Republic, the Prime Minister, Speaker of the Parliament, intellectuals, politicians, and 
social figures. It should also be divided equally between Muslims and Christians. The 
Committee should be unbiased and independent where it should work to benefit the 
country rather than satisfy political, economic or social interests (Dimitrova 2010).  
The National Committee is responsible for examining the means to eradicate 
political sectarianism, suggest them to the ministers and Parliament, and administer the 
implementation of the intermediary plan (Ziadeh 2006). It should also evaluate all 
feasible methods to achieve constitutional reforms and draft the new constitution 
according to a two-stage process. In the first phase, the National Committee should 
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ensure reconciliation and debate, while in the second phase it should write a draft text in 
the second phase (Dimitrova 2010). During this intermediary phase, the numerous 
sectarian groups should be equally represented in Cabinet, and confessional 
representation in different job positions should be replaced by merit and competence. 
Nonetheless, Grade One positions and their counterparts should be equally distributed 
among Muslims and Christians based on expertise without reserving a certain posts for 
a specific sect (Ziadeh 2006).  
Taif also proposes the formation of a Senate based on sectarian identities to 
maintain some of their privileges. A Senate is one way to start the process of abolishing 
political sectarianism. Article 22 of the Lebanese Constitution states: “With the election 
of the first Parliament on a national non-confessional basis, a Senate is established in 
which all the religious communities are represented. Its authority is limited to major 
national issues” (Ziadeh 2006, 245). However, no formula has been established for the 
formation of the Senate. The Senate would not contradict Parliament’s privileges even 
though it has the right to vote about laws related to personal status matters, laws 
administering the relationship between the state and sects, regulating public authorities, 
religious institutions, religious education, constitutional laws, electoral laws, and 
decentralization (Rashed 2011). 
Zalzal contends that abolishing political sectarianism is important for it would 
regulate citizens’ relationship with the state through laws rather than sectarian zu‘ama. 
However, she adds that some political leaders – such as the Speaker of the Parliament 
Nabih Berri – want to abolish political sectarianism to strengthen their own leadership 
at the expense of the national interest.
50
 On 21 January 2010, Berri proposed the 
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formation of a National Committee to eradicate political sectarianism (Dimitrova 2010). 
The initiative is still just a proposal, however. 
Some politicians and intellectuals are against eradicating political sectarianism, 
but favor adopting institutional reforms. Frayha stresses that the Lebanese people are 
sectarian by nature because they have been brought up in this way.
51
 Others argue that 
attempts to eradicate religion have failed. Thus, abolishing political sectarianism would 
not the solution but rather reforming the electoral law, implementing an optional civil 
personal status law, and adopting decentralization.
52
 
Antoine Messarra, a member of the Constitutional Council and professor of 
political science at USJ, indicates that the eighteen recognized sects in Lebanon are all 
minorities that constitute an ‘all minority situation’. He adds that Lebanon is a 
consensual model of democracy where addressing sectarianism and abolishing political 
sectarianism do not lead anywhere. As Messarra argues: 
On 18 August 1945, Charles Helou wrote an article in the Le Jour newspaper 
about eradicating political sectarianism. However, nothing has happened since 
then. What we really need is to focus on transcommunitarianism rather than 
abolishing political sectarianism.
53
 
 
However, whether there are real measures to abolish political sectarianism or achieve 
secularism, numerous reforms have to take place before. These reforms should focus on 
changing and enhancing the educational system and personal status laws. The next 
section examines some of these reforms.  
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6.4 – Recommended Reforms 
 Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts: “(1) Everyone 
has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and 
fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and 
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be 
equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. (2) Education shall be directed to the full 
development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of 
the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. (3) Parents have a prior right to 
choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children” (United Nations 2007, 
12). Based on this article and the fact that the Lebanese Constitution underlines 
Lebanon’s respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, several reforms 
should take place in the educational sector. 
Frayha contends that the only educational reform that occurred in Lebanon was 
in 1946 when the curricula were given a national orientation with national aims and 
objectives.
54
 According to Beydoun: 
Reforming the educational system is part of reforming the state. This does not 
mean that we should delay or wait for one of them. It is necessary that we have a 
coherent state that undertakes its normal tasks rather than a powerful state that 
threatens people.
55
 
 
El-Amine suggests five reforms that should be implemented in the Lebanese 
educational system: restructuring the Lebanese University, reforming higher education, 
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enhancing public education, improving vocational education, and reforming educational 
management (2004). 
The Lebanese state has to strengthen the quality of education in public schools 
and the Lebanese University, a source of education for everyone. The different 
Lebanese University branches should be replaced by five main campuses that include 
numerous faculties and majors spread among central Lebanese areas: Beirut, Greater 
Beirut, North, South, and Bekaa.
56
 In this way, students from different Lebanese areas 
would be able to attend the university. This, in turn, would increase social integration. 
Moreover, decreasing the branches of the Lebanese University would allow the state to 
focus its support on funding and supervising these five branches rather than the existing 
numerous branches that serve sectarian and political interests.  
 Regarding school books, the best solution is to have unified curricula that are 
taught in public and private schools. Books can differ in their teaching methodology and 
approaches, but what matters is the unified content of the books that should be 
supervised by the state. The Ministry of Education should not allow the publishing of 
books that encourage sectarian divisions among different Lebanese factions or that 
contradict national interests.
57
 Article 317 of the Penal Code indicates that any 
individual who advocates sectarianism would have to either pay a fine, or enter prison.
58
 
It is also important that all books have an activities section that can develop students’ 
critical thinking rather than to offset the rote learning adopted currently. In this sense 
schools can become capable of creating individuals who respect one another and have a 
sense of citizenship rather than constructing antagonistic sectarian identities.  
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Furthermore, schools should teach about religion rather than religion.
59
 This 
means that students should learn about the different religions and their practices to 
strengthen the similarities among them rather than to become religious. Specialized 
committees should be assigned to create new history books that highlight the common 
Lebanese history and strengthen one’s allegiance to his/her country rather than to 
sectarian elites. It should also celebrate diversity among citizens. Moreover, civic 
education books should also highlight the common values and culture between the 
Lebanese people and explain the political system. This might show students that the 
similarities between them are greater than the differences which might hinder possible 
sectarian strives. Younan stresses that national education sessions should be added to 
the school curricula, at least two or three times per week. According to Younan: 
This subject is different from civic education that teaches about municipalities, 
cleanliness, manners, and state institutions. National education requires 
specialized non-sectarian teachers. It is Lebanon’s salvation because it creates 
national identities.
60
 
 
Educational reforms would decrease sectarian identities to focus on creating a 
citizenship culture that it based on understanding and respecting the other.  
The Lebanese state should also implement an optional civil personal status law. 
This would give citizens the option to follow civil laws if they choose not to submit to 
the sectarian laws. Furthermore, individuals who want to have a civil marriage would be 
able to do so in Lebanon without having to travel to a foreign country and follow its 
laws. By adopting an optional civil personal status law, the Lebanese state would 
guarantee its sovereignty and rule of law. A specialized committee should be created to 
establish a reformed civil law that tackles all aspects of personal status matters – such as 
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inheritance, marriage, divorce, adoption, and child custody – without being hindered by 
sectarian laws. Some laws would then be amended to suit to citizens’ demands.  
The civil court should be separated from sectarian courts, with individuals given 
the choice to follow any of them. Civil courts should also have specialized civil judges 
who are capable of implementing such a new law. The civil judiciary’s review of 
sectarian courts should be empowered via appealing to the Constitutional Council 
regarding constitutional rights matters (Beck 2010).  In this case, the Lebanese state 
would respect its citizens’ inalienable human rights. It would also support freedom of 
belief, and freedom of opinion and expression. Even if the majority of the Lebanese are 
against the implementation of a civil personal status law, they should respect the secular 
minority’s right and take action towards achieving it.61 Moreover, reforms in personal 
status laws would ensure equality between men and women and hinder discrimination 
against secularists and non-recognized sectarian minorities. Strengthening civil laws 
over personal status codes, allowing intermarriage, and respecting the rights of 
secularists would empower the Lebanese state and reduce sectarian tensions (Beck 
2010). 
Knowing the cause of the problem is part of finding its solution. Lebanon’s case 
stresses that the confessional system and its sectarian elites are the problem that is 
hindering any kind of reform. Thus, a democratic reform in the country requires major 
change in its sectarian institutions. Only by adopting the aforementioned reforms can 
sectarianism be abolished from a country that has suffered from a civil strife due to this 
system. In this sense, Lebanese will be members of the same country rather than 
members of different sects. They would finally realize that their basic loyalty is to their 
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country rather than their sectarian patrons. Not finding a solution jeopardizes leading 
the country to an even greater civil war than that of 1975.  
 
6.5 – Lebanon: A Hopeful or Hopeless Case? 
Regardless of the impediments that might be faced towards achieving reforms, 
the Lebanese people are aware enough that adopting the recommended reforms will 
give rise to a democratic country that ensures its citizens’ needs and respects their 
freedom. Reform is not a process that can happen overnight but it rather takes a lot of 
time. However, this should not stop the Lebanese from developing their country that has 
survived a civil war and resisted Israeli occupation. After adopting educational and 
personal status laws reforms or changes, Lebanon might be able to successfully abolish 
political sectarianism and eventually reach the attained partial secularism. This would 
allow Lebanon to finally escape from “the whims of ethnic politicians versed in the 
clientalistic art of neopatrimonial politics, and the confessional state controlled by 
predatory politicians” (Salloukh 2009, 147). The recent uprisings in the Arab world 
stress that nothing is impossible. Change can happen despite the resistance of sectarian 
elites who seek their own interests at the expense of everyone else. 
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